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
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
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
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ARMY/MEDIA CONFLICT:
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD W. SHARPE

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solicited comments on the reasons for conflict and recommendations for improvement of the working relationship. A computer analysis was conducted and its results are included in the study. The survey showed senior Army officers hold a number of negative views about the media. An interview was conducted with Mr. Drew Middleton, a military reporter and correspondent for more than 40 years for the New York Times. His comments are transcribed in the study. Finally, the study includes a number of recommendations on how the Army might take a new direction in improving the Army/media relationship. The basic thrust is to start treating Army/media relations as an important part of the Army mission. Training and education must be developed and new operational approaches used to insure the entire chain of command is energized to participate in improving this relationship.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

Army/Media Conflict:

Origins, Development, and Recommendations

An Individual Study Project

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald W. Sharpe, FA (Author)

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30 May 1986

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Gerald W. Sharpe, LTC, FA

TITLE: Army/media conflict - Origins, Development, and Recommendations

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This study reviews the historical development of Army/media conflict. It shows that there has been conflict from the earliest days of the development of the newspaper. The reasons for conflict are reviewed in their historical context. Censorship, accreditation, and secrecy are each looked at as government functions which play a role in the relationship. A survey was conducted among US Army officers attending the US Army War College Class of 1986. The survey measured positive and negative attitudes toward the media and solicited comments on the reasons for conflict and recommendations for improvement of the working relationship. A computer analysis was conducted and its results are included in the study. The survey showed senior Army officers hold a number of negative views about the media. An interview was conducted with Mr. Drew Middleton, a military reporter and correspondent for more than 40 years for the New York Times. His comments are transcribed into the study. Finally, the study makes a number of recommendations on how the Army might take a new direction in improving the Army/media relationship. The basic thrust is to start treating Army/media relations as an important part of the Army mission. Training and education must be developed and new operational approaches used to insure the entire chain of command is energized to participate in improving our relationship.

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PREFACE

This Individual Study Project was conducted under the aegis of the US Army War College Public Affairs Office. The scope and general outline of the project were mutually agreed upon. The thrust of the study was to find the historical thread of the Army/media conflict and determine how War College students felt about the subject. I am indebted to Professor Lynn Hunt of Shippensburg University who reviewed the concept and helped to keep me on track along the way. LTC Nick Hawthorne, my Project Advisor, has been patient and helpful. The study could not have been carried out without the willing assistance of my classmates and their understanding. The major contributor to the success of the project has been the Automation Division of the Army War College, who not only processed my survey but allowed me to use their offices for weeks on end, answered my frantic evening telephone calls when the computer "blew-up," and provided more technical assistance than I ever thought possible. A major debt of gratitude goes to my family who, without exception, assisted in typing and proofing this paper.

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ARMY/MEDIA CONFLICT

Chapter 1

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

While military forces have been with civilization for thousands of years, the printed medium is a relatively recent innovation of mankind. News was passed by word of mouth in ancient times. Just prior to the birth of Christ, news was posted in town squares and other public places. Books were first published in China; one of them survives from as early as 868 A. D. By 911 a newspaper was being printed in Peking. Johann Gutenberg printed his famous Bible in 1440. The first existing copies of a newspaper originated in Germany in 1609. By the mid 1600's, newspapers existed in many European cities.(1)

Some 350 years ago, English rulers attempted to control or suppress the printed press over religious issues by banning and confiscating books.(2) The Thirty Years War produced the first recorded conflict over military news in a 1620 newspaper.(3) Twice in two years (1620 and 1621) the English king issued proclamations against "the great liberty of discourse concerning matters of state" referring to the unfavorable reporting on the war.(4) Later, Napoleon was to say, "Three hostile newspapers are more to be feared than one thousand bayonets."(5)

Printers came to America with the Pilgrims. The first

newspaper opened for business in 1690 in Boston, then America's largest city with 7,000 people. Within four days the Governor and Council of Massachusetts suppressed that newspaper on the basis of it not being licensed, stating "that therein is contained reflections of a very high nature: As also sundary doubtful and uncertain reports," and proclaiming the paper should "be suppressed and called in; strictly forbidding any person or persons for the future to set forth anything in print without license first obtained." (6) It was 14 years before another newspaper appeared. On April 24, 1704, Mr. John Campbell of Boston founded the Newsletter, America's first continuously published newspaper. (7) The government and the printed medium continued the battle over licensing and control for 20 more years.

Perhaps the most important event in the development of a free American press was the 1735 trial of Peter Zenger, then publisher of The New-York Weekly Journal. He was accused of publishing "seditious libels" about the governor which was said to "asperse his Excelency and vilify his administration." Zenger was defended by the most well known lawyer in the colonies, Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, and was acquitted after a direct appeal to the jury on the issue of the truth of his writings. (8) Another confrontation between the press and the government came with the imposition of a stamp tax in 1755 by the colonial government of Massachusetts and by New York in 1756. England's

Parliament passed a Stamp Act on March 22, 1765, imposing a tax on each half-page of a newspaper, effective November 1st of that year.(9) Newspapers throughout the colonies defied both of the Stamp Acts and the notion of a "free press" or "freedom of the press" from government control became a watchword for writers of the time.(10)

Friction between the military and the press in America during our revolution was largely confined to Tory newspapers. The December 16, 1776 edition of the New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, stated that, "The shattered remains of (General Washington's) Rebel Army, 'tis said, are got over into Jersies. Humanity cannot but pity a set of poor misguided men who are thus led into destruction, by dispicable and desperate leaders, against every idea of reason and duty, and without the least prospect of success."(11) The military did not attempt censorship during the Revolutionary War but it was tried by the colonial British Government. It was largely ineffective but mobs and threats of violence by organizations such as the "Sons of Liberty" put some newspapers out of business and curtailed the activities of others.(12)

Secrecy became an issue between the press and the military as well as between the Executive Department and Congress as early as 1792, because of the so-called "St. Clair Disaster." American Indians attacked General Arthur St. Clair's troops, who were

camped on the Wabash River, resulting in 600 men being lost. Out of this incident came the concept of "executive privilege" in which the Executive Department refused to release information about what had happened to Congress or to the public.(13) In 1803, the Supreme Court upheld the President's need for secrecy in the case of Marburg v. Madison.(14)

Meanwhile, in 1798, the government sought to restrict freedom of the press granted in the recently passed Bill of Rights. The "Sedition Act" of 1798 "provided that any person convicted of writing, printing, or uttering any 'false, scandalous, and malicious statements' against the government... shall be imprisoned not over two years and pay a fine not to exceed \$2,000."(15) The act was repealed two years later; all those imprisoned were released and those fined had their money restored with interest.(16)

The press took an anti-war posture in earnest during the War of 1812. Newspapers favoring the Federalist view wrote harshly about getting into another war. As an example, Benjamin Russell of the Columbian Centinel, Columbus, Ohio, wrote often about the "waste of blood and property" and "a useless and unnecessary war."(17) Newspapers all over New England were opposed to the conflict and left no doubt about it in their columns.

For 50 years after the War of 1812, there was little for the

American press and the military to disagree about. The victory at the Alamo in 1836 brought rave reviews. The invention of the telegraph allowed news reporting of the Mexican War (1846-1848) on a relatively current basis and war pictures, made from woodcuts, appeared for the first time in American newspapers.(18) A military-press relationship, for good or evil, was coming of age.

An event in Europe was to play a dramatic role in the development of the western world's military-press relations. Colonel Harry Summers, in an address to the symposium on "Lessons from Recent Wars" held at the US Army War College on Friday, September 21, 1984, outlined what was so significant about the development.(19)

"Historical examples clarify everything," Clausewitz wrote, and went on to say that 'this is particularly true of the art of war.'(19a) As will be seen, it is also true for an appreciation of the role of western media in recent wars, for the roots of such wartime media reporting extend back over a hundred years to the Crimean War in 1854, the first 'media war' in history. Then, as now, the impact on public attitudes and political institutions was particularly powerful.

This impact is vividly portrayed in Rupert Furneaux's excellent biography of 'the father' of modern war correspondents, Sir William Howard Russell, of The Times.(19b) Not tainted with the prejudices of the Vietnam war, it is written in 1944, long before television, as we naively believe, 'brought war into our living room for the first time.' We may be technically correct about the 'living room' but as Furneaux reminds us, to Victorian readers of Russell's dispatches in The Times, 'war ceased to be an objective undertaking taking place in some far-off field. Russell brought war to the fireside, the breakfast table, the Government office and the Treasury Bench.'(19c) As he relates, 'Until the war in the Crimea the British public...were necessarily content with the official dispatch and communique. When Russell's letters were received from the Crimea, their impact was terrific. Nothing like them had ever been written from the front before. For the first time the newspaper reader was presented with a realistic and factual account not only of

battle and siege, but of the every day life in camp and base.'(19d) In particularly apt language, Furneaux commented on 'the photographic quality' of Russell's dispatches and remarked that Russell was 'endowed with the capability (to see) events both in full and in detail...with an eye like a photographic lens...(and then) retransfer the scene back to paper in its original form by language so graphic that his readers felt themselves in the presence of the events described.'(19e)

Today we complain that television footage is inherently misleading because the camera focuses on only a small part of the action. Answering similar charges, Russell reminded his critics of what every combat veteran knows full well: 'Not even the General who directs the operation can describe a battle. It is proverbially impossible to do so...each colonel in the smoke and tumult and excitement of the conflict sees what is done by his own men...he beholds but the enemy before him and that small portion of his regiment which may be close to him at the time.'(19f)

Russell first supported the British Army's actions and captured his readers' attention by his vivid battlefield reporting, including his famous account of The Charge of the Light Brigade. But, as the war stalemated into a siege, he turned his attention to British military inefficiency and the attendant suffering of the troops. These dispatches shocked the conscience of the nation. 'To the official mind,' Furneaux wrote, 'conditions of this sort in a British military expedition were no new thing, rather it was a commonplace and a necessary condition of war,' but, in words that apply to the impact of television on war reporting today, 'there was one great difference in the expedition to the Crimea. The representatives of the press, in itself a new vigorous power, were present to chronicle and write home of the horrors which resulted from military mismanagement. Thus for the first time the people of England were told what was happening at the seat of war, and with one voice they demanded action.'(19g)

The official reaction makes the furor over Vietnam war reporting pale by comparison. ...Drawing on Russell's dispatches, the editor of The Times headlined a series of articles with such inflammatory language (that)...Ministers resigned,...Russell and The Times had thrown out the government."(19h)

Following closely on the heels of the Crimean war came our Civil War. For the first time in American history there was prompt, on-the-scene reporting. There were also direct, heated confrontations between newspapermen and generals. Some reporters

and newspapers carried on running battles with certain generals while others championed selected officers whom they favored. In most journalism texts, at least one chapter, if not more, is dedicated to the development of news media during the Civil War. Statements like the following are common: "In contrast with World Wars I and II, reporters in the War Between the States were much more irresponsible(20) and "never was there a war in which arm-chair generalship from newspaper offices was more vociferous, in which more editors became military strategists overnight."(21)

There were two issues creating the controversy -- censorship and access to the battlefield and soldiers. Censorship, as previously noted, had been tried before with little success. During the Civil War, however, the art of censorship and its acceptance by the press set historic precedents. At first, censorship was tried by restricting the means to transmit news: e.g., the telegraph was restricted. Later, attempts were made to control journalists' access to news through "accreditation" by military commanders and through voluntary restraints agreed to by the journalists.

Near the end of the war the press and the military, at least in the north, agreed upon sufficiently stringent rules to allow

General Sherman to make his famous march to the sea without suffering breaches in security committed by newsmen.(22) Legal action was also taken against both northern and southern newspapers when their governments' felt they had violated the agreed-upon standards of restraint.

Access to battles and soldiers created far more controversy than censoring military secrets out of dispatches. Many war correspondents ("specials" as they were called in those days) traveled halfway across the country to be "where the action was." When a commander attempted to restrain them from the battlefield, conflict ensued. In fact, these "specials" probably had more access to battlefields during the Civil War than in any war before or since, simply because of a lack of any formal restriction on a widespread basis by the government.

Commanders reacted in different ways to reporters. General Henry W. Halleck "expelled all correspondents from the Union forces in the East." In response, the New York Times wrote, "More harm would be done to the Union by expulsion of correspondents than these correspondents now do by occasional exposure to military blunders, imbecilities, peccadilloes, corruption, drunkenness, and navery or by their occasional failures to puff every functionary as much as he thinks he deserves." (23) General Sherman had no use for the press and it

had little use for him. It is said that when he was told three correspondents had been killed by an artillery shell he said. "Good, now we shall have news of hell before breakfast." General Sherman also caused a reporter for the New York Herald, Mr. Tom Knox, to be tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for giving away military secrets. Mr. Knox's life was spared by Presidential decree.(24)

The Civil War set a new standard for American war reporting and ample seeds for a feud between the press and the military had been planted and nurtured. But these seeds did not blossom into full life until nearly 100 years later when the Vietnam conflict created similarly heated, vitriolic exchanges of views, charges, and countercharges. In the intervening century, however, the seeds were all but forgotten during relatively "popular" wars.

The relationship of the military with the press was to improve with the war with Spain in Cuba in 1898. William Randolph Hearst, publisher of the New York Evening Journal, is generally held responsible for having helped to get the war started. His detractors (who sounded very much like some critics did during the Vietnam War) wrote against his "misrepresentations of the facts, deliberate invention of facts...and wanton recklessness."(25) The war was a popular one. "It was near at hand. American commanders allowed unusual freedom to

correspondents. It was a small war, and thus not too difficult to cover. American arms on land and sea met with a series of successes which could be reported brilliantly. It was a short war, so the public interest could be fully maintained." (26)

Both the First and Second World Wars found the press, the nation, the military, and the people united in a common cause, strongly exhibiting what is often called "national will." There were minor skirmishes with the press during the period and censorship of one kind or another was practiced in both wars. Accreditation by military leaders became an accepted way of controlling who covered the battles. The means of communication (radio, telegraph, and mail) were all placed under tight control. There was no technology, such as satellites, to allow circumvention of those controls. Generally the media were supportive and cooperative.

During World War I, President Wilson harnessed the energy of the press under an office called the "Committee on Public Information," headed by Mr. George Creel, former editor of the Rocky Mountain News and one of the leading journalists of the day. This committee is credited with garnering much of the media support for the war effort. One recent author describes Creel's work as follows: "Nothing that happened to the press and public of any of the European belligerents was in any way comparable to

the star-spangled campaign of censorship, patriotic advertising, and propaganda that was mounted in the United States." (27)

The press was instrumental in gathering support for the Western Allies long before America entered World War II. William Allen White, who had run the Emporia, Kansas Gazette, organized a "committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies," in 1939, voluntarily enlisting many members of the media. His propaganda efforts "reached formidable proportions...by the Fall of 1940." (28)

Official propaganda was tied to censorship after America's entry into World War II. The involvement of media personnel on behalf of the government and in support of the war effort seems strange to a nation still struggling with its Vietnam and Watergate experiences. Whether the media would align itself in favor of the government and a major war in the future may be a vital factor in our ability to put forth a credible defense. A mechanism for such an effort would be an excellent subject of discussion for a future media/military symposium or journalistic workshop.

Chapter 1

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ARMY/MEDIA CONFLICT

Chapter 2

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A review of the historical development of Army/media conflict in chapter one, shows a few threads of continuity. Governmental dissatisfaction with the information being put forth by the media was the earliest problem. What to do about it brought suppression in the form of regulation and censorship. The development of a role for the "war correspondent" saw the governmental/media conflict sharpen its focus to a military/media one. Whether a correspondent had a right to gather news on the battlefield became an issue and a procedure called "accreditation" was developed. Later, the passage of laws and acceptance of certain principles brought the government's right to secrecy to the forefront of the military/media conflict. Personal animosities between the media and military persons have also developed over the years. While many of us believe that an unprecedented level of animosity developed between military and media during the Vietnam War, it was probably no greater than during the English Crimean War or the American Civil War.

The Korean War brought some new dimensions to the military/media conflict and carried most of the old ones forward. There were serious questions as to how much effort should be put

into the war. Should we be there at all? What role should the media play? Were we going to be defeated/

In the early months of the Korean War, there was virtually no censorship. In January of 1951 General Douglas MacArthur instituted strict controls. His order covered not only military information but "that (which) would injure the morale of US Forces or would embarrass the United States." This new censorship directive also placed journalists under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which meant they could be court-martialed for violations. The media branded these rules as "political and psychological" but they were not changed until after General MacArthur was relieved.(1)

Lack of support on the homefront also created military/media conflict in Korea. General Matthew Ridgeway, who followed General MacArthur, pleaded with the Pentagon to "wake up the people at home" and asked "that they be told the truth about this war," but his requests had little effect.(2) The media was developing its capabilities to better tell the truth about the war during this period. Radio broadcasts consisting of short "bulletins" were made from Korea but television was still a relatively new phenomenon and TV broadcasts were not attempted from the war zone.(3)

The Media came under heavy attack by a number of military

leaders during the war. General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's chief of intelligence and the man responsible for censorship, declared, "These ragpickers of modern literature, roughly between belles-lettres and the police blotter, have developed an insufferable but peculiarly American characteristic: they have come to believe they are omniscient." In the introduction to a Willoughby magazine article in 1951, MacArthur wrote that "the entire effort to distort and misrepresent the causes leading to the existing situation represents one of the most scandalous propaganda efforts to pervert the truth in modern times." (4) In general, the American people were indifferent to the war and the memory of our stalemate there helped set the popular tone during our future involvement in Vietnam.

Controversy between the American media and the military came of age during the Vietnam conflict. Censorship of the kind used in previous wars was not imposed although defacto censorship was practiced because of what could be told to the media. Almost anything could be reported from the war zone. Censorship had been a very simple fact of life in World War II, and was not perceived to be all bad. Mr. Drew Middleton, who began working for the New York Times as a military reporter in 1942, stated in an interview that "everything y wrote was going through a censor anyway. But that was an advantage to us. We learned a lot more, and even if we could not use the stuf, you had a better

knowledge of the battle." (5) In Vietnam, the Army might have been better off if, in return for acknowledged censorship of some type, senior Army officers had brought reporters into their confidences and shared all available information with them. With regard to Vietnam, Mr. Middleton stated that "When they were planning something big, I don't think they should have sprung it on us. They should have taken four or five correspondents, a pool, and said, 'now look, here is what is going to happen, and when it happens we will take you to the six or seven spots, but don't say anything.' Then they would have gotten much better coverage." (6)

Accreditation by military officials was given to more than 1600 media representatives during the Vietnam conflict and more than 500 correspondents were in-country during "Tet" 1968. (8) Conflict arose over virtually every issue seen in previous wars. In looking back on the causes of conflict between the Army and the press in Vietnam, there is plenty of blame (if that term should be used) for both sides. On the part of the Army, we did not do an effective job of integrating the correspondents into our operations and confidences. We placed few, if any, restrictions on who could be accredited. We often confused the questioning of our national purpose with personal criticism of our capabilities and performance. At the senior leadership level, we failed to articulate the need or requirement to involve

and/or consult the American public in developing a national strategy which would be accepted by the majority of our citizens. We made no organized attempt to document or publicize the atrocities committed by the enemy and thus could only remain silent about the American atrocity stories put forth over our own media's channels.,

On the part of the media, failures are perhaps in the "eye of the beholder." They certainly did not train or educate the majority of correspondents in the why's and wherefore's of military operations. There was no journalistic movement, as there had been in World War I and II, to gain the support of the American people for the war effort. There was a technological explosion which allowed short, isolated segments of the war to be broadcast live without any attempt to place them in the contexts of battles or operations. As a result there was little or no understanding of what the plan was (if there was a plan) or what military objective was being achieved at what cost of American lives.

The failures on both sides have left a bad taste in the mouths of all concerned. Each points to the other as being responsible. In comments written by US Army War College students in response to the survey covered in Chapter Three, feelings of mistrust and dislike of the media are clearly evident more than a

decade after Vietnam. In an interview conducted with the publisher and two editors of The New York Times, on March 24, 1986, they made the point that the military and the media need to understand each other better if we expect to improve our relationship.(8) Some standards and controls, mutually agreed upon, are among the suggestions made most often. What is clear is that modern technology has made obsolete many of the controls exercised in previous wars unless we come to some understanding over voluntary compliance in the old ways.

The future of military/media relations is dependent on increased communications, understanding, and agreement. Conflict, in future wars, may be as much a function of national purpose as it is interpersonal relationships and rules. We need increased interaction at every level that will at least allow us to understand each other's strengths and weaknesses.

Some would say our relationship can only get better, as it hit rock bottom by the end of the war in Vietnam - I say, "Amen"

Chapter 2

ENDNOTES

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2. Hoenberg, Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause. pg.310
3. Ibid. pg.309
4. Mott, American Journalism. pg.856
5. Middleton, Drew. Unpublished interview conducted by LTC Gerald W. Sharpe, March 24, 1986, at the New York Times Building, New York, New York.
6. Ibid.
7. Skinner, Benjamin B. "The Impact of the Press on Modern War: Issue Vietnam" Unpublished Profesional Study # 4237, US Air Force Air War College, 1971.
8. Interview conducted by LTC Gerald W. Sharpe, March 24, 1986, at the New York Times Building, New York, New York.

Chapter 3

STUDENT SURVEY ANALYSIS

The survey, beginning on page 112, was distributed to 190 US Army Officers attending the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013, during April of 1986. 105 usable Scantron Answer Sheets were returned and processed by computer at the War College's Information Technology Division. 68 students filled out the optional comment sheet describing both causes of conflict and recommendations for its solution. See pages 89 through 101 for the complete transcript of these comments. Computer analysis was conducted on each individual question and the answers to all questions were cross-tabulated against source of commission (question 32), time spent with the media (question 38), and party preference (question 41). For ease of display, the data on the eleven students receiving their commissions by direct appointment was omitted from the cross-tabulation (it would have required another 42 pages of data). See page 41 for the computer analysis.

In general, the survey reveals a poor to fair, low to moderate, or negative to neutral attitude toward the media by the survey respondents. The officers believed their own relationship with the media was better than the Army's. Their own trust level

in the media, as compared to the nation, was about the same on the low side, but more officers had a high trust level than they thought the nation as a whole did. When comparing their own attitudes toward the media with that of their supervisor and the Army, there were more officers on the negative end of the scale than either their supervisors or the Army. The following charts summarize the percentage responses to relationship questions:

#1	Current relations between media/Army	poor 22.9%	fair 64.8%	good 12.4%	excellent 0%	
#2	Current relations, officers/media	poor 6.9%	fair 43.1%	good 46.1%	excellent 2.9%	
#3	Trust level of officers in media	low 41.3%	moderate 50.0%	high 8.7%		
#6	Trust level of nation in media	low 39.0%	moderate 57.1%	high 3.8%		
#25	Supervisors attitude towards the media	very neg 1.0%	neg 36.5%	neutral 43.6%	pos 19.8%	very pos 0%
#26	Army's attitude towards the media	very neg 3.9%	neg 55.3%	neutral 27.2%	pos 13.6%	very pos 0%

#31	Own attitude	very neg	neg	neutral	pos	very pos
	toward media	6.9%	44.1%	36.3%	12.7%	0%
		to	to	to	to	
#4	How views have	good/poor	poor/poor	good/good	poor/good	
	changed over years	21.1%	32.7%	21.2%	24.0%	

The cross tabulations show that ROTC and West Point officers hold a more negative view of the media than do Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates on the majority of the questions. West Point officers were more negative on their individual attitudes on question two than OCS or ROTC officers, but less so on question 31. The amount of time spent with the media produced no discernable trends. Expressing a Democratic party preference was a clear predictor of a more positive attitude towards the media.

The amount of time individuals devote to the relationship and the effects of more or less time spent with the media was the subject of four questions. More than half the respondents (53.5%) had never spent more than one day with the media. Only 7% had spent five or more days. Most believed that spending more time with the media would have some or a great effect (80%) and more than 90% felt this would have either no effect or a positive one. 94 respondents replied they had spent less than one half hour each week during their last assignment dealing with the

media, while well over half (69) spent no time each week. The following charts summarize the percentage responses to questions on the relationship of time:

#9	Longest time spent with media	less 1	1-2days	3-4days	5-7days	more 7		
		53.5%	23.8%	14.9%	2.0%	5.0%		
#24	Effect more time would have	none	little	some	great			
		5.7%	14.3%	66.7%	13.3%			
#29	Effect of time on relationship	very neg	neg	none	positive	very pos		
		1.0%	8.8%	44.1%	44.1%	2.0%		
#38	# of hour spent weekly with media	0	1/2	3/4	5/10	11/15	16/20	20+
		69	25	4	3	1	0	0

Cross-tabulations show very little pattern. Question 29 shows that all those who have spent three or more days with the media were neutral to very positive of their prediction on the effect of time on the relationship.

The issue of secrecy and access to the news was addressed in four questions. Slightly more than half the respondents felt some pre-established rules should be set up for censorship. Only two percent thought commanders should not have censorship

authority. In reviewing two past actual cases, 59.9% thought the media should not have published the "Pentagon Papers" while one fourth thought they should. A great majority of the officers agreed with the decision to ban the media during the first 24 hours on Grenada (89.2%), while less than half felt they should have been banned during the second 24 hours. The following charts show the data on secrecy and access to the news:

		pre-established			
#11	Authority of cdr to censor info	none	some	rules only	complete
		2.0%	17.6%	52.0%	28.4%
#12	Was media right in publishing Pent Papers	yes	no	don't know	
		25.0%	52.9%	22.1%	
#14	Was Army right in banning media from Grenada-1st 24 hrs	yes	no	don't know	
		89.2%	6.9%	2.9%	
#15	Was Army right in banning media from Grenada-2nd 24 hrs	yes	no	don't know	
		49.0%	29.4%	20.6%	

The cross-tabulation shows that those who were the strongest in support of the press were also the strongest in supporting their ban from Grenada - that is those expressing a Democratic

preference. West Pointers, along with Democrats, held their preference more over the second day issue than did others.

The subject of knowledge on the part of the media about the Army and of how much training officers had about the media was covered in two questions. More than 65% of the officers believed that the media has little or no knowledge about the US Army, while slightly less than four percent thought they had a great knowledge. More than one half of the officers indicated they had less than one day of training in their careers about the media and more than 71% had three days or less. The following charts show the responses on knowledge/training questions:

#28	How much knowledge	none	little	some	great	
	media has of Army	4.9%	61.2%	30.1%	3.9%	
#30	How much training	none	less 1	1-3days	4-7days	more 7
	did officer have	2.0%	48.5%	20.8%	20.8%	2.0%

Cross-tabulations show little or no pattern.

Five questions addressed sources of conflict with the media. Attitude was the clear cause of conflict with the Army in the minds of the majority of officers (68.6%), with knowledge being the clear second choice (59.0%). A fewer number thought attitude was the major problem when it came to a personal view, but it

and honesty received the largest responses in the greatest cause category. (42.7% and 31.1% respectively) Knowledge edged out honesty in the second greatest cause after attitude. Over one half of the officers had never been misquoted but nearly 29% had been misquoted two or more times. The following charts show responses by question:

#20	Cause of Army	organization	attitude	knowledge	training	
	conflict with media	1.0%	68.6%	28.6%	1.9%	
#21	2nd cause of Army	organization	attitude	knowledge	training	
	conflict with media	3.8%	26.7%	59.0%	10.5%	
#22	Cause of individual	timeliness	honesty	attitude	knowledge	
	conflict with media	3.9%	31.1%	42.7%	22.3%	
#23	2nd cause of indiv	timeliness	honesty	attitude	knowledge	
	conflict with media	4.9%	23.3%	44.7%	27.2%	
#27	# times misquoted	never	once	twice	3 to 4	5+
	by the media	53.8%	17.3%	14.4%	13.5%	1.0%

Those who spend more time with the media tend to select knowledge or organization as the prime cause of conflict rather than attitude. West Point officers leaned more toward attitude being

the problem. ROTC officers reported a lesser problem with being misquoted than did their contemporaries.

Five questions were directed toward the officers views on the accuracy of news sources and which networks and magazines are the most and least favorable to the Army. The print media was the clear leader, being listed first by 78.7% of the officers. TV received 14.6%, while radio was selected by only 6.0%. 11.9% put TV first and print last. ABC and U S News and World Report were the clear choices as most favorable, while CBS and Time Magazine were clearly the least favorable. The following charts show the results on questions relating to the source of news.

		print	print	radio	radio	TV	TV
#10	Most accurate	radio	TV	TV	print	radio	print
	source of	TV	radio	print	TV	print	radio
	news	48.5%	30.1%	1.9%	4.9%	11.7%	2.9%
#16	Network most	ABC		CBS		NBC	
	favorable	61.5%		14.3%		23.1%	
#17	Network least	ABC		CBS		NBC	
	favorable	14.3%		69.2%		16.5%	
#18	News magazine	Newsweek		Time		US News & World Report	
	most favorable	9.5%		13.7%		76.8%	

#19	News magazine	Newsweek	Time	US News & World Report
	least favorable	27.5%	63.3%	8.9%

OCS officers selected the print media as the most favorable to the Army less often than did ROTC or West Point officers and selected radio as the most favorable at a much higher rate. Democratic respondents went for TV first at five times the rate of Republicans or Independents. OCS graduates split their vote for least favorable network between CBS and NBC while ROTC and West Point officers voted solidly for CBS. Democratic respondents strongly favored Newsweek as the most favorable news magazine at more than ten times the rate of either Republicans or Democrats. They also selected U S News and World Report as the least favorable at about eight times the rate of other parties.

Written comments on the chief causes of conflict between the Army and the media reveal a basic mistrust of the media's motives and objectives. They point to the media as being the problem. Officers hold strong views about a number of reasons for the conflict. The following reasons were expressed most often: Sensationalism on the part of the media drew 17 comments, lack of knowledge - 15, being concerned with profits -11, distrust and lack of balance drew nine each, reporting only bad news received seven, and lack of honesty and bias on the part of the media received six each. Other reasons drawing responses were

integrity (5), attitude (4), misquoting (4), left-leaning (3), lack of ethics (3), lack of understanding (3), failure to recognise a need for secrecy (3), lack of accuracy (2), worry about ratings (2) difference in values (2), being too liberal (2), and the pressures of competition (2). The following reasons received one comment each: Need for training, difference in aims, difference in goals, lack of confidence, being too subjective, difference in motives, being self serving, and being too concerned with ratings.

A few comments put blame on the Army side for the conflict. One indicated he did not like the Public Affairs Officer and thought officers needed training in how to deal with the media. Seven officers indicated the Army had a lack of understanding about the media. One attributed the cause to our "narrow-mindedness and our "hang-ups" on terminology, precision, and secrecy. Four officers indicated the Army does not provide enough "relevant/factual information" and on occasion "stonewalls."

A complete transcript of comments begins on page 89.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The historical review in Chapters One and Two shows we have lived with controversy between the media and the military for almost as long as the media has been in existence. The survey results in Chapter Three from the US Army War College (USAWC) Class of 1986, if they are representative of all senior Army officers, clearly show that the relationship is plagued with a number of negative factors.

What can the US Army do to improve this relationship? What policy changes should be made, if any? What training or education should be undertaken, if any? These and other questions, need a careful review in light of what we know about the reasons for conflict.

Officers, responding to the survey, had a number of suggestions as to what could be done to improve the current environment. Doing more to educate the Army officer and the media about each other was the most common theme. Being honest and forthcoming was the largest single response (13 answers). Establishing more contact with the media was mentioned 11 times. Several officers felt we should tighten up our access rules and more vigorously prosecute those who violate our laws. Three said

we should talk more openly and not "stonewall," while the same number said we should do more to get stories and information to the media.

Our problems with the media can be divided into three basic categories. Those based upon attitude, training/education, and organization. All three reasons are closely intertwined but attitude was the most commonly mentioned by survey respondents.

Negative attitudes are learned and are based upon any number of inputs of information such as: personal experience, personality, history, perception, and/or one's social/economic background, as examples. How the Army deals with the attitudes of its senior members toward the media will have a great impact on how the Army as a whole develops and/or modifies its attitude toward the media in future years. If the media's attitudes about the Army are a direct reflection of the attitudes of those in the Army, then we should develop a master plan to change or negate the negative attitudes currently held by senior officers. In my experience, these attitudes are quickly and often subtly transferred to juniors without much overt action.

From the survey data in Chapter Three, we know that many senior officers have had very little personal experience in a direct working relationship with the media and have had even less formal training about how the media works or its roles and missions in American society. In spite of this, they hold very

strong negative views about the media. How much effect more training or education would have on the officer corps is open to question. We clearly have an organization of public affairs offices that plays a role in Army/media conflict. If we expect to change attitudes toward the media, to properly train and educate our officers, and make effective use of all of our organizations, we will have to take a number of actions designed to decrease the negative inputs officers receive and increase the positive ones. There is no hope that this can be done in some simple, direct way, such as giving an order or establishing a media course required for all senior officers. Solutions must cover a wide spectrum of actions and activities.

If I were given the power to attack and solve this problem, I would do the following things: I would include at least eight hours in the curriculum of ROTC and West Point about how the media works, what its role is in American society, and, most important, what the positive aspects of our relationship have been through two world wars and Korea. I would institute a short, two hour block in all basic courses on dealing with the media in peace and war. This block would instruct/indoctrinate officers on the need to be open, honest, frank, and available to the media; to seek their personal friendship; and to include media people in the official as well as social aspects of their Army life.

I would include a media day in all advanced courses in which members of the local and state media would hold a panel

discussion in the morning and small group discussions in the afternoon. All students would be required to complete a programmed text/video program on media relations. At our staff colleges I would require a course in public relations/media development in which officers would study the successful public relations methods used by industry. They would be required to develop a public relations plan for a unit and would be schooled in handling interviews. They would be required to visit a media organization somewhere in the country and prepare a written report on how its operating methods could be best utilized to tell the positive aspects of our story to the American people. Through this exercise, every student would gain a personal appreciation for what the Army can do to gain access, in a positive way, to the media; not to mention all the personal relationships that would be established.

At our Senior Service Colleges (SSC) we should also hold "media days" patterned after the one held at the US Army War College. These "media days" provide senior media persons the opportunity to interact with senior officers. An attempt should be made to hold an informal cocktail party after these sessions so that more personal interaction can take place. Each college should develop a number of topics for research in the media relations arena which could provide the Army beneficial information and offer them to the students (there are currently none offered at USAWC). I would insure that the available body of research on military/media relations is collected in each of

our Senior Service College libraries. A compendium of what is available should be sent to Journalism, Public Relations, and Communications Departments and Schools in colleges and universities across the nation. I would add WW II and Korean War correspondents to our current oral history program so that we do not lose the historical basis for a positive military/media relationship. I would increase the speakers panel from one to six at each SSC, which would give us a much greater ability to communicate the Army story in civilian communities. Finally, I would make mandatory for all SSC students the current television workshop held on a voluntary basis by the US Army War College.

For the Army as a whole, I would assemble a media/military task force which would be charged with developing a set of peacetime and wartime operating rules and principles which would better serve the media's desire for full and complete access while honoring the nations need for a certain amount of secrecy and close-holding of information. This panel would also be asked to develop recommendations on how we can better serve the medias needs at every level without undo impact on military operations.

I would have a Chief of Staff "White Paper" prepared to go to every officer in the Army. It would emphasise the need for a positive, open, and honest relationship with the media. In this paper I would have the Chief direct that every commander devote some of his or her time each month to doing something to build a more positive relationship with members of the media. (I would

require an entry to be made on the Officer Efficiency Report Support Form to this effect.) The letter would encourage all officers to join civic clubs and be more active in local organizations, such as scouts, PTA'S, etc., and would stress the need to sign up for the speakers program run by each PAO office. I would include a paragraph that reviews the positive aspects of our relationship during the first 60 years of this century and direct a return to this attitude on the part of all members of the Army team.

I would direct the inclusion of media relations as a subject of Inspector General inspections at every level of the Army. I would direct that media relations be included in every operations plan and order written, and that its provisions be practiced in every exercise participated in by Army forces. I would direct the commanders of camps, posts, and stations to hold regular (preferably quarterly) military/media seminars in which senior leaders get together to discuss what positive and negative experiences took place since the last meeting and agree on what changes or solutions can make the relationship more positive.

I would establish a Media Intern Program which would offer a position in our public affairs offices to meet the requirements of a degree in Journalism, Public Relations, or Communications. This would require a careful plan be developed on how to best expose these students to all aspects of the public affairs business, while satisfying the educational institutions

requirements. I would also establish a Media Intern Program for line Army officers of captain and major rank for one weeks duration (five days). This would offer the Army officer the opportunity to spend one week in the shoes of a media person, to establish contacts in the media community, and gain a more complete understanding of how the media works. This program would be sold to the media on the basis of it contributing to the understanding of each other's organizations by both parties, as well as providing some free labor and perhaps new ideas to the media organization. A sales team would be established on a temporary duty basis to visit national media organizations and sell them on the idea of signing up for a certain number of intern weeks each year. Local PAO's would have the responsibility for signing up state and local media organizations.

I would create a Media Orientation Tour Program which would offer to take media persons, newly assigned to cover the Army, out on a tour of certain installations and units. This tour would be designed to show what soldiers do, what they do it with, and how soldiers feel about serving in the US Army. They would not receive briefings and be bored by speeches, but would visit unit and organizations for informal discussions and observation of actual training. I would also modify the present Educator Tour Program run by the Recruiting Command so that it could include up to ten percent of its tour members from the media. I would then instruct the Recruiting Command Commander to insure

that each battalion did its best to include media people on every tour.

I would task the Department of the Army PAO to set up a program that would offer guest speakers to all Journalism, Public Relations, and Communications Departments or Schools in colleges and universities. I would also offer military facilities for field trips by classes from these and other institutions.

I would direct the preparation of feature stories with appropriate pictures on a weekly basis that could be personalized and sent out to media organizations by active, reserve, and National Guard units (with special emphasis to Recruiting Battalion Headquarters). I would also create a radio hometown news release program that would be carried out on an area support basis by PAO's.

I would direct that commanders assigned Public Affairs Officers make them primary staff officers, include them in the decision making process, and consulte them on the media impact of daily decisions. I would instruct that several readable pamphlets be prepared for use by all Army members on the subjects of Army/media relations, TV and radio interviews, unit public relations plans, media news requirements, and media intern programs. In addition, I would direct that a field manual be written that covers the principles of Army/media relations.

I would insure that students attending public affairs training, participate in projects and research that complement the Army public affairs program and do not do "make work" projects just to learn how things are done. We have a great pool of young, aggressive students who could do a world of good for the Army through their efforts

Finally, I would insure that our leadership makes a habit of going out of their way to contact media people when things go wrong and offer to fully cooperate in getting them the facts as we know them. We must stop hiding behind the old excuse of "that's under investigation and I'm not at liberty to talk about it." We must be willing to risk some displeasure on the part of our lawyers and investigators to serve the greater good of the Army as a whole.

While many of the ideas here are not new, they say in essence that we must make Army/media relations a high priority, rather than the current "ho-hum - don't bother me with trivia" that we see so often when the subject comes up. Unless the Army is willing to take the initiative and move toward a more positive relationship, we will continue to live with the misperceptions and haunting negativism left over from the Vietnam conflict and Watergate. I believe the cost of carrying out such a program would be minimal and would be the most productive dollars the Army has spent in recent years.

If this study only contributes to a greater awareness of the problem, then it will have been worth the effort. I would hope, however, that the Army leadership will undertake a study, by experts, of how we can solve this problem, and do it soon.

1. In general, current relations between the Army/media are best described as

- (1) poor
- (2) fair
- (3) good
- (4) excellent

Q01

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
POOR	1	24	22.9	22.9	22.9
FAIR	2	68	64.8	64.8	87.6
GOOD	3	13	12.4	12.4	100.0
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.895	Std Err	.057	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.587	Variance	.345
Kurtosis	-.106	S E Kurt	.467	Skewness	.019
S E Skew	.236	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	199.000		

Valid Cases 105 Missing Cases 0

Crosstabulation: Q02
By Q01

		Count	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	
Q01	Q02	Row Pct	1	2	3	Row Total
		Col Pct				
	1		15	31	7	53
ROTC			28.3	58.5	13.2	52.0
			62.5	47.7	53.8	
	2		3	13	2	18
West Point			16.7	72.2	11.1	17.6
			12.5	20.0	15.4	
	3		2	15	2	19
OCS			10.5	78.9	10.5	18.6
			8.3	23.1	15.4	
Column Total			24	65	13	102
			23.5	63.7	12.7	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q01

Q01→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q38	0	1 100.0 4.2			1 1.0
None	1	18 26.1 75.0	45 65.2 68.2	6 8.7 46.2	69 67.0
1-2	2	4 16.0 16.7	17 68.0 25.8	4 16.0 30.8	25 24.3
3-4	3		2 50.0 3.0	2 50.0 15.4	4 3.9
5-10	4	1 33.3 4.2	1 33.3 1.5	1 33.3 7.7	3 2.9
11-5	5		1 100.0 1.5		1 1.0
Column Total		24 23.3	66 64.1	13 12.6	103 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 2

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q01

Q01→	Count	POOR	FAIR	GOOD	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	3	
Q41					
	1		4	2	6
Democratic			66.7	33.3	6.2
			6.5	15.4	
	2	17	45	9	71
Republican		23.9	63.4	12.7	73.2
		77.3	72.6	69.2	
	3	5	13	2	20
Independent		25.0	65.0	10.0	20.6
		22.7	21.0	15.4	
	Column Total	22 22.7	62 63.9	13 13.4	97 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

2. Your relationship with your counterparts in the Army/media are best described as

- (1) poor
- (2) fair
- (3) good
- (4) excellent

Q02

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
POOR	1	7	6.7	6.9	6.9
FAIR	2	44	41.9	43.1	50.0
GOOD	3	47	44.8	46.1	96.1
EXCELLENT	4	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
	5	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.480	Std Err	.071	Median	2.500
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.714	Variance	.510
Kurtosis	.782	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	.152
S E Skew	.239	Range	4.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	253.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q02

Count		POOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLEN	Row Total
Q02	Q32	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1	3	24	24	1	52
		5.8	46.2	46.2	1.9	50.0
		42.9	54.5	51.1	50.0	
West Point	2	3	9	6		18
		16.7	50.0	33.3		16.7
		42.9	20.5	12.8		
OCS	3		8	9	1	18
			44.4	50.0	5.6	18.0
			18.2	19.1	50.0	
Column Total		7	44	47	2	100
Total		7.0	44.0	47.0	2.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q02

Q02->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	FOOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLEN	Row Total
		1	2	3	T 4	
Q38	0		1 100.0 2.3			1 1.0
None	1	5 7.4 71.4	34 50.0 77.3	28 41.2 60.9	1 1.5 33.3	68 68.0
1-2	2	1 4.3 14.3	6 26.1 13.6	14 60.9 30.4	2 8.7 66.7	23 23.0
3-4	3		2 50.0 4.5	2 50.0 4.5		4 4.0
5-10	4	1 33.3 14.3	1 33.3 2.3	1 33.3 2.2		3 3.0
11-5	5			1 100.0 2.2		1 1.0
Column Total		7 7.0	44 44.0	46 46.0	3 3.0	100 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q02

Q02->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	FOOR	FAIR	GOOD	EXCELLEN	Row Total
		1	2	3	T 4	
Q41	1		3 50.0 7.1	3 50.0 6.6		6 6.4
Democratic	2	6 8.8 100.0	28 41.2 66.7	32 47.1 72.7	2 2.9 100.0	68 72.3
Republican	3		11 55.0 26.2	9 45.0 20.5		20 21.3
Independent						
Column Total		6 6.4	42 44.7	44 46.8	2 2.1	94 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 11

3. Your trust level in your counterparts in the Army/media
can best be described as

- (1) low
- (2) moderate
- (3) high

Q03

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	43	41.0	41.3	41.3
MODERATE	2	52	49.5	50.0	91.3
HIGH	3	9	8.6	8.7	100.0
	-1	1	1.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.673	Std Err	.062	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.630	Variance	.397
Kurtosis	-.652	S E Kurt	.469	Skewness	.385
S E Skew	.237	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	174.000		

Valid Cases 104 Missing Cases 1

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q03

Q03->		Count	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
Q32		Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	3	
ROTC	1		21	28	4	53
			39.6	52.8	7.5	52.5
			48.8	57.1	44.4	
West Point	2		9	8		17
			52.9	47.1		16.8
			20.9	16.3		
DCS	3		5	10	4	19
			26.3	52.6	21.1	18.8
			11.6	20.4	44.4	
Column Total			43	49	9	101
			42.6	48.5	8.9	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q03

Q03→	Count Row Fct Col Fct	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q38	0	1 100.0 2.4			1 1.0
None	1	31 45.6 73.8	32 47.1 62.7	5 7.4 55.6	68 66.7
1-2	2	8 32.0 19.0	15 60.0 29.4	2 8.0 22.2	25 24.5
3-4	3	1 25.0 2.4	2 50.0 3.9	1 25.0 11.1	4 3.9
5-10	4	1 33.3 2.4	1 33.3 2.0	1 33.3 11.1	3 2.9
11-5	5		1 100.0 2.0		1 1.0
Column Total		42 41.2	51 50.0	9 8.8	102 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q03

Q03→	Count	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
	Row Fct Col Fct	1	2	3	
Q41					
	1	1	4	1	6
Democratic		16.7	66.7	16.7	6.3
		2.5	8.2	14.3	
	2	31	34	5	70
Republican		44.3	48.6	7.1	72.9
		77.5	69.4	71.4	
	3	8	11	1	20
Independent		40.0	55.0	5.0	20.8
		20.0	22.4	14.3	
	Column Total	40 41.7	49 51.0	7 7.3	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

4. How have your views changed over the years about your counterparts in the Army/media?

- (1) good to poor
- (2) poor and stayed poor
- (3) good and stayed good
- (4) poor to good

Q04

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
GOOD TO POOR	1	23	21.9	22.1	22.1
POOR - STAYED POOR	2	34	32.4	32.7	54.8
GOOD - STAYED GOOD	3	22	21.0	21.2	76.0
POOR TO GOOD	4	25	23.8	24.0	100.0
	-1	1	1.0	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.471	Std Err	.107	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	1.088	Variance	1.184
Kurtosis	-1.270	S E Kurt	.469	Skewness	.121
S E Skew	.237	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	257.000		

Valid Cases 104 Missing Cases 1

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q04

Q04 →	Count	GOOD TO	POOR - S	GOOD - S	POOR TO	Row
	Row Fct	POOR	TAYED PO	TAYED GO	GOOD	Total
	Col Fct	1	2	3	4	
Q32						
1		13	18	9	12	52
ROTC		25.0	34.6	17.3	23.1	51.5
		59.1	52.9	42.9	50.0	
2		4	6	3	5	18
West Point		22.2	33.3	16.7	27.8	17.8
		18.2	17.6	14.3	20.8	
3		3	6	6	4	19
OCS		15.8	31.6	31.6	21.1	18.8
		13.6	17.6	28.6	16.7	
Column		22	34	21	24	101
Total		21.8	33.7	20.8	23.8	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q04

Q04→	Count	GOOD TO	POOR - S	GOOD - S	POOR TO	
	Row Pct	POOR	TAYED PO	TAYED GO	GOOD	Row
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	Total
Q38						
None	1	15 21.7 68.2	26 37.7 76.5	11 15.9 50.0	17 24.6 70.8	69 67.6
1-2	2	7 28.0 31.8	5 20.0 14.7	8 32.0 36.4	5 20.0 20.8	25 24.5
3-4	3		2 50.0 5.9	1 25.0 4.5	1 25.0 4.2	4 3.9
5-10	4		1 33.3 2.9	1 33.3 4.5	1 33.3 4.2	3 2.9
11-5	5			1 100.0 4.5		1 1.0
Column Total		22 21.6	34 33.3	22 21.6	24 23.5	102 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q04

Q04→	Count	GOOD TO	POOR - S	GOOD - S	POOR TO	
	Row Pct	POOR	TAYED PO	TAYED GO	GOOD	Row
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	Total
Q41						
Democratic	1		3 50.0 9.1	3 50.0 15.0		6 6.3
Republican	2	14 19.7 73.7	24 33.8 72.7	12 16.9 60.0	21 29.6 87.5	71 74.0
Independent	3	5 26.3 26.3	6 31.6 18.2	5 26.3 25.0	3 15.8 12.5	19 19.8
Column Total		19 19.8	33 34.4	20 20.8	24 25.0	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

5. How would you describe the effects of the U.S. Army as a factor in American society today?

- (1) negative
- (2) neutral
- (3) positive

Q05

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEGATIVE	1	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
NEUTRAL	2	19	18.1	18.4	21.4
POSITIVE	3	80	76.2	77.7	99.0
	5	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.777	Std Err	.053	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.541	Variance	.293
Kurtosis	4.362	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-.874
S E Skew	.238	Range	4.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	286.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q05

Q05->		Count	NEGATIVE	NEUTRAL	POSITIVE	
Row	Fct		1	2	3	5
Col	Pct					
Q32						Row Total
ROTC	1	2	8	40	1	51
		3.9	15.7	78.4	2.0	51.0
		66.7	42.1	51.9	100.0	
West Point	2		5	13		18
			27.8	72.2		18.0
			26.3	16.9		
DCS	3		5	14		19
			26.3	73.7		19.0
			26.3	18.2		
Column Total		3	19	77	1	100
		Total	3.0	19.0	77.0	1.0 100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q05

Q05->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	NEGATIVE NEUTRAL POSITIVE				Row Total
		1	2	3	5	
Q38						
None	1	1	15	51	1	68
		1.5 33.3	22.1 83.3	75.0 64.6	1.5 100.0	67.3
1-2	2	1	3	21		25
		4.0 33.3	12.0 16.7	84.0 26.6		24.8
3-4	3			4		4
				100.0 5.1		4.0
5-10	4	1		2		3
		33.3 33.3		66.7 2.5		3.0
11-5	5			1		1
				100.0 1.3		1.0
Column Total		3 3.0	18 17.8	79 78.2	1 1.0	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q05

Q05->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	NEGATIVE NEUTRAL POSITIVE				Row Total
		1	2	3	5	
Q41						
Democratic	1		1	5		6
			16.7 5.6	83.3 6.8		6.3
Republican	2	3	15	51	1	70
		4.3 100.0	21.4 83.3	72.9 69.9	1.4 100.0	73.7
Independent	3		2	17		19
			10.5 11.1	89.5 23.3		20.0
Column Total		3 3.2	18 18.9	73 76.8	1 1.1	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

6. How would you describe the trust level of the nation in the media?

- (1) low
- (2) moderate
- (3) high

Q06

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	41	39.0	39.0	39.0
MODERATE	2	60	57.1	57.1	96.2
HIGH	3	4	3.8	3.8	100.0
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.648	Std Err	.054	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.554	Variance	.307
Kurtosis	-.768	S E Kurt	.467	Skewness	.080
S E Skew	.236	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	173.000		

Valid Cases 105 Missing Cases 0

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q06

Count		LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
Row Pct					
Col Pct		1	2	3	
Q32	1	21	30	2	53
	ROTC	39.6	56.6	3.8	52.0
		51.2	52.6	50.0	
	2	10	8		18
	West Point	55.6	44.4		17.6
		24.4	14.0		
	3	5	12	2	19
	DCS	26.3	63.2	10.5	18.6
		12.2	21.1	50.0	
Column Total		41	57	4	102
Total		40.2	55.9	3.9	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q06

Q06→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q38					
	0	1 100.0 2.5			1 1.0
None	1	30 43.5 75.0	35 50.7 59.3	4 5.8 100.0	69 67.0
1-2	2	7 28.0 17.5	18 72.0 30.5		25 24.3
3-4	3	1 25.0 2.5	3 75.0 5.1		4 3.9
5-10	4		3 100.0 5.1		3 2.9
11-5	5	1 100.0 2.5			1 1.0
Column Total		40 38.8	59 57.3	4 3.9	103 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 2

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q06

Q06→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q41					
Democratic	1	2 33.3 5.0	3 50.0 5.7	1 16.7 25.0	6 6.2
Republican	2	33 46.5 82.5	35 49.3 66.0	3 4.2 75.0	71 73.2
Independent	3	5 25.0 12.5	15 75.0 28.3		20 20.6
Column Total		40 41.2	53 54.6	4 4.1	97 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 52 8

7. How would you describe the trust level of the country
in the U.S. Army?

- (1) low
- (2) moderate
- (3) high

Q07

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	4	3.8	3.9	3.9
MODERATE	2	52	49.5	50.5	54.4
HIGH	3	47	44.8	45.6	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.417	Std Err	.056	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.569	Variance	.324
Kurtosis	-.798	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-.319
S E Skew	.238	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	249.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q07

		Count	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	
Q07->	Q32	Row Pct	1	2	3	Row Total
		Col Pct				
ROTC	1		3	28	20	51
			5.9	54.9	39.2	51.0
			75.0	53.8	45.5	
West Point	2		1	8	9	18
			5.6	44.4	50.0	18.0
			25.0	15.4	20.5	
OCS	3			9	10	19
				47.4	52.6	19.0
				17.3	22.7	
Column Total			4	52	44	100
			4.0	52.0	44.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q07

Q07->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q38					
None	1	3 4.3 75.0	39 56.5 76.5	27 39.1 58.7	69 69.3
	2	1 4.2 25.0	9 37.5 17.6	14 58.3 30.4	24 23.8
	3		2 50.0 3.9	2 50.0 4.3	4 4.0
3-4	4			3 100.0 6.5	3 3.0
	5		1 100.0 2.0		1 1.0
5-10					
11-5					
Column Total		4 4.0	51 50.5	46 45.5	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q07

Q07->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	Row Total
		1	2	3	
Q41					
Democratic	1		3 50.0 6.1	3 50.0 7.1	6 6.3
	2	4 5.7 100.0	36 51.4 73.5	30 42.9 71.4	70 73.7
	3		10 52.6 20.4	9 47.4 21.4	19 20.0
Republican					
Column Total		4 4.2	49 51.6	42 44.2	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

9. What is the longest period of time you have spent with your counterpart organization at any one time or period?

- (1) one day or less
- (2) one to two days
- (3) three to four days
- (4) five to seven days
- (5) more than seven days

Q09

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1 DAY OR LESS	1	54	51.4	53.5	53.5
1-2 DAYS	2	24	22.9	23.8	77.2
3-4 DAYS	3	15	14.3	14.9	92.1
5-7 DAYS	4	2	1.9	2.0	94.1
OVER 7 DAYS	5	5	4.8	5.0	99.0
	6	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	4	3.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.842	Std Err	.116	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.164	Variance	1.355
Kurtosis	2.081	S E Kurt	.476	Skewness	1.558
S E Skew	.240	Range	5.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	6.000	Sum	186.000		

Valid Cases 101 Missing Cases 4

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q09

Q09->		Count	1 DAY OR LESS	1-2 DAYS	3-4 DAYS	5-7 DAYS	OVER 7 DAYS	Row Total
Q32		Row Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
		Col Pct						
ROTC	1		32	11	8		1	52
			61.5	21.2	15.4		1.9	52.5
			59.3	50.0	53.3		20.0	
West Point	2		9	3	2	1	1	16
			56.3	18.8	12.5	6.3	6.3	16.2
			16.7	13.6	13.3	50.0	20.0	
OCS	3		7	5	3	1	2	19
			36.8	26.3	15.8	5.3	10.5	19.2
			13.0	22.7	20.0	50.0	40.0	
Column Total			54	22	15	2	5	99
Total			54.5	22.2	15.2	2.0	5.1	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q09

Q09->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	1 DAY OR LESS	1-2 DAYS	3-4 DAYS	5-7 DAYS	OVER 7 D AYS	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q38							
	0	1 100.0 1.9					1 1.0
None	1	39 59.1 73.6	15 22.7 65.2	11 16.7 73.3	1 1.5 50.0		66 66.7
1-2	2	11 45.8 20.8	7 29.2 30.4	1 4.2 6.7	1 4.2 50.0	3 12.5 60.0	24 24.2
3-4	3	1 25.0 1.9		2 50.0 13.3		1 25.0 20.0	4 4.0
5-10	4	1 33.3 1.9		1 33.3 6.7		1 33.3 20.0	3 3.0
11-5	5		1 100.0 4.3				1 1.0
Column Total		53 53.5	23 23.2	15 15.2	2 2.0	5 5.1	99 100.0

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q09

Q09->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	1 DAY OR LESS	1-2 DAYS	3-4 DAYS	5-7 DAYS	OVER 7 D AYS	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q41							
Democratic	1	2 33.3 3.8	2 33.3 9.1	1 16.7 7.7		1 16.7 25.0	6 6.4
Republican	2	39 57.4 73.6	17 25.0 77.3	8 11.8 61.5	1 1.5 50.0	3 4.4 75.0	68 72.3
Independent	3	12 60.0 22.6	3 15.0 13.5	4 20.0 30.8	1 5.0 50.0		20 21.3
Column Total		53 56.4	22 23.4	15 13.8	2 2.1	4 4.3	94 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 11

10. Which order best describes your view of the most accurate source of news (most to least)?

- (1) print, radio, TV
- (2) print, TV, radio
- (3) radio, TV, print
- (4) radio, print, TV
- (5) TV, radio, print
- (6) TV, print, radio

Q10

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Print, Radio, TV	1	50	47.6	48.5	48.5
Print, TV, Radio	2	31	29.5	30.1	78.6
Radio, TV, Print	3	2	1.9	1.9	80.6
Radio, Print, TV	4	5	4.8	4.9	85.4
TV, Radio, Print	5	12	11.4	11.7	97.1
TV, Print, Radio	6	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.097	Std Err	.147	Median	2.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.492	Variance	2.226
Kurtosis	.452	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	1.330
S E Skew	.238	Range	5.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	6.000	Sum	216.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q10

Q10->		Count	Print, R	Print, T	Radio, T	Radio, P	TV, Rad	TV, Print	Row Total
		Row Fct	adio, TV	V, Radio	V, Print	rint, TV	o, Print	t, Radio	
Q32		Col Fct	1	2	3	4	5	6	
ROTC	1		29	14	1	1	5	2	5
			55.8	26.9	1.9	1.9	9.6	3.8	52.1
			59.2	46.7	50.0	20.0	45.5	66.7	
West Point	2		10	6		1	1		1
			55.6	33.3		5.6	5.6		18.1
			20.4	20.0		20.0	9.1		
OCS	3		5	6	1	2	3	1	1
			27.8	33.3	5.6	11.1	16.7	5.6	18.1
			10.2	20.0	50.0	40.0	27.3	33.3	
Direct	4		4	4		1	2		1
			36.4	36.4		9.1	18.2		11.1
			8.2	13.3		20.0	18.2		
	5		1						1
			100.0						
			2.0						
Column Total			49	30	2	5	11	3	10
			49.0	30.0	2.0	5.0	11.0	3.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q10

Q10→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Print, R	Print, T	Radio, T	Radio, F	TV, Radi	TV, Prin	Row Total
		adio, TV 1	V, Radio 2	V, Print 3	rint, TV 4	o, Print 5	t, Radio 6	
Q38								
	0	1 100.0 2.0						1 1.0
None	1	36 53.7 72.0	17 25.4 56.7	1 1.5 50.0	3 4.5 60.0	7 10.4 63.6	3 4.5 100.0	67 66.3
1-2	2	13 52.0 26.0	7 28.0 23.3	1 4.0 50.0	2 8.0 40.0	2 8.0 18.2		25 24.6
3-4	3		3 75.0 10.0			1 25.0 9.1		4 4.0
5-10	4		2 66.7 6.7			1 33.3 9.1		3 3.0
11-5	5		1 100.0 3.3					1 1.0
(Continued)	Column Total	50 49.5	30 29.7	2 2.0	5 5.0	11 10.9	3 3.0	101 100.0

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q10

Q10→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Print, R	Print, T	Radio, T	Radio, F	TV, Radi	TV, Prin	Row Total
		adio, TV 1	V, Radio 2	V, Print 3	rint, TV 4	o, Print 5	t, Radio 6	
Q41								
Democratic	1	2 33.3 4.3	1 16.7 3.6			3 50.0 27.3		6 6.3
Republican	2	34 49.3 72.3	22 31.9 78.6		4 5.8 80.0	6 8.7 54.5	3 4.3 100.0	69 72.6
Independent	3	11 55.0 23.4	5 25.0 17.9	1 5.0 100.0	1 5.0 20.0	2 10.0 18.2		20 21.1
	Column Total	47 49.5	28 29.5	1 1.1	5 5.3	11 11.6	3 3.2	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10
5 8

11. What authority should a combat commander have to censor news which involves military operations?

- (1) none
- (2) some
- (3) based on preestablished rules only
- (4) complete

Q11

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
None	1	2	1.9	2.0	2.0
Some	2	18	17.1	17.6	19.6
Freestablihed Rules	3	53	50.5	52.0	71.6
Complete	4	29	27.6	28.4	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.069	Std Err	.073	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.735	Variance	.540
Kurtosis	-.137	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	-.414
S E Skew	.239	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	313.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q12
By Q11

		Count	None	Some	Freestab lished R	Complete	Row Total
Q11=	Q12	Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1			11	29	12	52
				21.2	55.8	23.1	52.5
				61.1	56.9	42.9	
West Point	2			3	8	5	16
				18.8	50.0	31.3	16.2
				16.7	15.7	17.9	
OCS	3		2	3	7	7	19
			10.5	15.8	36.8	36.8	19.2
			100.0	16.7	13.7	25.0	
Column Total			2	18	51	28	99
			2.0	18.2	51.5	28.3	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q11

Q11->	Count	None	Some	Preestab	Complete	Row
	Row Pct			lished R		Total
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q38						
None	1	1 1.5 50.0	11 16.2 61.1	34 50.0 66.7	22 32.4 75.9	68 68.0
1-2	2	1 4.2 50.0	4 16.7 22.2	14 58.3 27.5	5 20.8 17.2	24 24.0
3-4	3		2 50.0 11.1	1 25.0 2.0	1 25.0 3.4	4 4.0
5-10	4		1 33.3 5.6	1 33.3 2.0	1 33.3 3.4	3 3.0
11-5	5			1 100.0 2.0		1 1.0
Column Total		2 2.0	18 18.0	51 51.0	29 29.0	100 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q11

Q11->	Count	Some	Preestab	Complete	Row
	Row Pct		lished R		Total
	Col Pct	2	3	4	
Q41					
Democratic	1	2 33.3 11.8	3 50.0 6.0	1 16.7 3.7	6 6.4
Republican	2	13 18.8 76.5	34 49.3 68.0	22 31.9 81.5	69 73.4
Independent	3	2 10.5 11.8	13 68.4 26.0	4 21.1 14.8	19 20.2
Column Total		17 18.1	50 53.2	27 28.7	94 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 11

12. Was the media correct in publishing the "Pentagon Papers?"

- (1) yes
- (2) no
- (3) I don't know

Q12

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	26	24.8	25.0	25.0
No	2	55	52.4	52.9	77.9
Don't know	3	23	21.9	22.1	100.0
	-1	1	1.0	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.971	Std Err	.068	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.689	Variance	.475
Kurtosis	-.858	S E Kurt	.469	Skewness	.037
S E Skew	.237	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	205.000		

Valid Cases 104 Missing Cases 1

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q12

Q12->		Count	Yes	No	Don't kn	Row Total
		Row Pct	1	2	ow 3	
Q32		Col Pct				
ROTC	1		14	26	13	53
			26.4	49.1	24.5	52.0
			56.0	48.1	56.5	
West Point	2		5	9	4	18
			27.8	50.0	22.2	17.6
			20.0	16.7	17.4	
OCS	3		4	12	3	19
			21.1	63.2	15.8	18.6
			16.0	22.2	13.0	
Column Total			25	54	23	102
			24.5	52.9	22.5	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q12

Q12->	Count	Yes	No	Don't kn	Row
	Row Pct	1	2	3	Total
	Col Pct				
Q38					
	0	1			1
		100.0			1.0
		4.0			
None	1	16	38	15	69
		23.2	55.1	21.7	67.6
		64.0	70.4	65.2	
1-2	2	5	12	7	24
		20.8	50.0	29.2	23.5
		20.0	22.2	30.4	
3-4	3	2	1	1	4
		50.0	25.0	25.0	3.9
		8.0	1.9	4.3	
5-10	4		3		3
			100.0		2.9
			5.6		
11-5	5	1			1
		100.0			1.0
		4.0			
Column		25	54	23	102
Total		24.5	52.9	22.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q12

Q12->	Count	Yes	No	Don't kn	Row
	Row Pct	1	2	3	Total
	Col Pct				
Q41					
Democratic	1	2	3	1	6
		33.3	50.0	16.7	6.2
		8.7	5.8	4.5	
Republican	2	16	39	16	71
		22.5	54.9	22.5	73.2
		69.6	75.0	72.7	
Independent	3	5	10	5	20
		25.0	50.0	25.0	20.6
		21.7	19.2	22.7	
Column		23	52	22	97
Total		23.7	53.6	22.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

13. Was the military correct in banning the media from Grenada during the first 24 hours of the operation?

- (1) yes
- (2) no
- (3) I don't know

Q13

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Yes	1	91	86.7	89.2	90.2
No	2	7	6.7	6.9	97.1
Don't know	3	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.118	Std Err	.042	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	.429	Variance	.184
Kurtosis	10.398	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	2.977
S E Skew	.239	Range	3.000	Minimum	0.0
Maximum	3.000	Sum	114.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q13

Q13->		Count	Yes	No	Don't know	Row Total
		Row Pct				
		Col Pct	1	2	3	
Q32						
	1		44	5	1	50
ROTC			88.0	10.0	2.0	50.5
			49.4	71.4	33.3	
	2		16	1	1	18
West Point			88.9	5.6	5.6	18.2
			18.0	14.3	33.3	
	3		18	1		19
OCS			94.7	5.3		19.2
			20.2	14.3		
	Column Total		89	7	3	99
			89.9	7.1	3.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q13

Q13->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes			No		Don't know		Row Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Q38									
	0			1					1
				100.0					1.0
				14.3					
None	1		65	2	2				69
			94.2	2.9	2.9				69.0
			73.0	28.6	66.7				
1-2	2	1	20	3					24
		4.2	83.3	12.5					24.0
		100.0	22.5	42.9					
3-4	3		2	1					3
			66.7	33.3					3.0
			2.2	14.3					
5-10	4		2						2
			100.0						2.0
			2.2						
11-5	5				1				1
					100.0				1.0
					33.3				
Column Total		1	89	7	3				100
		1.0	89.0	7.0	3.0				100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q13

Q13->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes			No		Don't know		Row Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Q41									
Democratic	1		6						6
			100.0						6.3
			7.1						
Republican	2	1	61	4	3				69
		1.4	88.4	5.8	4.3				72.6
		100.0	71.8	66.7	100.0				
Independent	3		18	2					20
			90.0	10.0					21.1
			21.2	33.3					
Column Total		1	85	6	3				95
		1.1	89.5	6.3	3.2				100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

14. What about the second 24 hours?

- (1) yes
- (2) no
- (3) I don't know

Q14

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Yes	1	50	47.6	49.0	50.0
No	2	30	28.6	29.4	79.4
Don't know	3	21	20.0	20.6	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.696	Std Err	.080	Median	1.500
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	.806	Variance	.649
Kurtosis	-1.073	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	.495
S E Skew	.239	Range	3.000	Minimum	0.0
Maximum	3.000	Sum	173.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q14

Q14->		Count	Yes	No	Don't kn	Row Total
		Row Pct			ow	
		Col Pct	1	2	3	
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----						
Q32	1	24	16	11		51
ROTC		47.1	31.4	21.6		51.5
		49.0	55.2	52.4		
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----						
West Point	2	11	4	3		18
		61.1	22.2	16.7		18.2
		22.4	13.8	14.3		
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----						
DCS	3	9	5	4		18
		50.0	27.8	22.2		18.2
		18.4	17.2	19.0		
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----						
Column		49	29	21		99
Total		49.5	29.3	21.2		100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q14

Q14→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes 0	No 1	Don't know 2	Row Total
Q38					
	0		1 100.0 3.4		1 1.0
None	1	33 50.0 67.3	17 25.8 58.6	16 24.2 76.2	66 66.0
1-2	2	1 4.0 100.0	12 48.0 24.5	9 36.0 31.0	25 25.0
3-4	3		2 50.0 4.1	1 25.0 3.4	4 4.0
5-10	4		1 33.3 2.0	1 33.3 3.4	3 3.0
11-5	5		1 100.0 2.0		1 1.0
	Column Total	1 1.0	49 49.0	29 29.0	21 21.0
					100 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q14

Q14→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Yes 0	No 1	Don't know 2	Row Total
Q41					
Democratic	1		5 83.3 10.6	1 16.7 5.3	6 6.4
Republican	2	1 1.5 100.0	37 54.4 78.7	17 25.0 63.0	68 72.3
Independent	3		5 25.0 10.6	10 50.0 37.0	20 21.3
	Column Total	1 1.1	47 50.0	27 28.7	19 20.2
					94 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 66 11

15. In which order were the following most responsible for our loss in Viet Nam (most to least)?

- (1) US government, military, media
- (2) US government, media, military
- (3) media, US government, military
- (4) media, military, US government
- (5) military, US government, media
- (6) military, media, US government

Q15

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Govt, Military, Medi	1	34	32.4	33.7	33.7
Govt, Media, Militar	2	48	45.7	47.5	81.2
Media, Govt, Militar	3	17	16.2	16.8	98.0
Media, Military, Gov	4	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
Military, Media, Gov	6	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	4	3.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.891	Std Err	.083	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.835	Variance	.698
Kurtosis	4.578	S E Kurt	.476	Skewness	1.363
S E Skew	.240	Range	5.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	6.000	Sum	191.000		

Valid Cases 101 Missing Cases 4

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q15

Q15->		Count	Govt, Mil	Govt, Me	Media, G	Media, M	Military	Row
		Row Pct	itary, 1	dia, Mil 2	ovt, Mil 3	ilitary, 4	, Media, 6	Total
Q32		Col Pct						
ROTC	1		20	23	6		1	50
			40.0	46.0	12.0		2.0	51.0
			60.6	50.0	35.3		100.0	
West Point	2		3	11	3			17
			17.6	64.7	17.6			17.3
			9.1	23.9	17.6			
OCS	3		5	7	6	1		19
			26.3	36.8	31.6	5.3		19.4
			15.2	15.2	35.3	100.0		
Column			33	46	17	1	1	98
Total			33.7	46.9	17.3	1.0	1.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q15

Q15->	Count	Govt, Mil	Govt, Me	Media, G	Media, M	Military	Row Total
	Row Pct	lilitary, 1	dia, Mil 2	ovt, Mil 3	ilitary, 4	, Media, 6	
Col Pct							
Q38							
None	1	23	33	11	1		68
		33.8	48.5	16.2	1.5		68.7
		67.6	70.2	68.8	100.0		
1-2	2	10	10	4		1	25
		40.0	40.0	16.0		4.0	25.3
		29.4	21.3	25.0		100.0	
3-4	3		3	1			4
			75.0	25.0			4.0
			6.4	6.3			
5-10	4	1	1				2
		50.0	50.0				2.0
		2.9	2.1				
Column Total		34	47	16	1	1	99
		34.3	47.5	16.2	1.0	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 6

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q15

Q15->	Count	Govt, Mil	Govt, Me	Media, G	Media, M	Military	Row Total
	Row Pct	lilitary, 1	dia, Mil 2	ovt, Mil 3	ilitary, 4	, Media, 6	
Col Pct							
Q41							
Democratic	1	2	3	1			6
		33.3	50.0	16.7			6.5
		6.5	6.5	7.1			
Republican	2	22	35	10		1	68
		32.4	51.5	14.7		1.5	73.1
		71.0	76.1	71.4		100.0	
Independent	3	7	8	3	1		19
		36.8	42.1	15.8	5.3		20.4
		22.6	17.4	21.4	100.0		
Column Total		31	46	14	1	1	93
		33.3	49.5	15.1	1.1	1.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 12

16. Which network is the most favorable to the Army?

- (1) ABC
- (2) CBS
- (3) NBC

Q16

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	1.0	1.1	1.1
ABC	1	56	53.3	61.5	62.6
CBS	2	13	12.4	14.3	76.9
NBC	3	21	20.0	23.1	100.0
	-1	14	13.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0
Mean	1.593	Std Err	.090	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	.856	Variance	.733
Kurtosis	-.981	S E Kurt	.500	Skewness	.789
S E Skew	.253	Range	3.000	Minimum	0.0
Maximum	3.000	Sum	145.000		

Valid Cases 91 Missing Cases 14

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q16

Q16->		Count	Q32			
		Row Pct	ABC	CBS	NBC	Row Total
		Col Pct	0	1	2	3
ROTC	1		29	5	13	47
			61.7	10.6	27.7	53.4
			53.7	41.7	61.9	
West Point	2		9	1	3	13
			69.2	7.7	23.1	14.8
			16.7	8.3	14.3	
OCS	3		1	3	4	17
			5.9	17.6	23.5	19.3
			100.0	16.7	25.0	19.0
Column Total			1	54	12	21
			1.1	61.4	13.6	23.9
						88
						100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q16

Q16->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Q38				Row Total
		0	1	2	3	
Q38	0				1 100.0 4.8	1 1.1
None	1	1 1.6 100.0	40 65.6 74.1	7 11.5 53.8	13 21.3 61.9	61 68.5
1-2	2		11 52.4 20.4	4 19.0 30.8	6 28.6 28.6	21 23.6
3-4	3		2 50.0 3.7	1 25.0 7.7	1 25.0 4.8	4 4.5
5-10	4		1 50.0 1.9	1 50.0 7.7		2 2.2
Column Total		1 1.1	54 60.7	13 14.6	21 23.6	89 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 16

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q16

Q16->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Q41				Row Total
		0	1	2	3	
Q41	1		2 40.0 4.1	3 60.0 23.1		5 6.0
Democratic	2	1 1.6 100.0	36 59.0 73.5	6 9.8 46.2	18 29.5 85.7	61 72.6
Republican	3		11 61.1 22.4	4 22.2 30.8	3 16.7 14.3	18 21.4
Independent						
Column Total		1 1.2	49 58.3	13 15.5	21 25.0	84 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 1

17. Which network is the least favorable to the Army?

- (1) ABC
- (2) CBS
- (3) NBC

Q17

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ABC	1	13	12.4	14.3	14.3
CBS	2	63	60.0	69.2	83.5
NBC	3	15	14.3	16.5	100.0
	-1	14	13.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.022	Std Err	.058	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.557	Variance	.311
Kurtosis	.332	S E Kurt	.500	Skewness	.010
S E Skew	.253	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	184.000		

Valid Cases 91 Missing Cases 14

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q17

		Count	ABC	CBS	NBC	
Q17	Q32	Row Pct				Row Total
		Col Pct	1	2	3	
	1		5	38	3	46
ROTC			10.9	82.6	6.5	52.3
			41.7	62.3	20.0	
	2		1	11	1	13
West Point			7.7	84.6	7.7	14.6
			8.3	18.0	6.7	
	3		4	8	6	18
OCS			22.2	44.4	33.3	20.5
			33.3	13.1	40.0	
		Column Total	12	61	15	88
			13.6	69.3	17.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q17

Q17->	Count	ABC	CBS	NBC	Row
	Row Fct				Total
Q38	Col Fct	1	2	3	
None	1	6	44	10	60
		10.0	73.3	16.7	67.4
		46.2	71.0	71.4	
1-2	2	5	14	3	22
		22.7	63.6	13.6	24.7
		38.5	22.6	21.4	
3-4	3	1	3		4
		25.0	75.0		4.5
		7.7	4.8		
5-10	4	1	1	1	3
		33.3	33.3	33.3	3.4
		7.7	1.6	7.1	
Column		13	62	14	89
Total		14.6	69.7	15.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 16

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q17

Q17->	Count Row Fct Col Fct	ABC	CBS	NBC	Row Total	
Q41		1	2	3		
Democratic	1	2 40.0 15.4	2 40.0 3.5	1 20.0 7.7	5 6.0	
	Republican	2	7 11.5 53.8	46 75.4 80.7	8 13.1 61.5	61 73.5
		Independent	3	4 23.5 30.8	9 52.9 15.8	4 23.5 30.8
Column Total			13 15.7	57 68.7	13 15.7	83 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 22

18. Which news magazine is most favorable to the Army?

- (1) Newsweek
- (2) Time
- (3) U S News and World Report

Q18

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Newsweek	1	9	8.6	9.5	9.5
Time	2	13	12.4	13.7	23.2
US News	3	73	69.5	76.8	100.0
	-1	10	9.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.674	Std Err	.066	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.643	Variance	.414
Kurtosis	1.814	S E Kurt	.490	Skewness	-1.782
S E Skew	.247	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	254.000		

Valid Cases 95 Missing Cases 10

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q18

Q18->	Count	Q32			Row Total
		Newsweek	Time	US News	
	Row Pct	1	2	3	
	Col Pct				
ROTC	1	5	1	42	48
		10.4	2.1	87.5	52.2
		55.6	7.7	60.0	
West Point	2	1	2	12	15
		6.7	13.3	80.0	16.3
		11.1	15.4	17.1	
OCS	3	3	4	11	18
		16.7	22.2	61.1	19.6
		33.3	30.8	15.7	
Column Total		9	13	70	92
	Total	9.8	14.1	76.1	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q18

Q18→	Count	Newsweek	Time	US News	Row Total
	Row Pct	1	2	3	
Col Pct					
Q38					
None	1	6	7	49	62
		9.7	11.3	79.0	66.7
		66.7	58.3	68.1	
1-2	2	1	3	20	24
		4.2	12.5	83.3	25.8
		11.1	25.0	27.8	
3-4	3	2		2	4
		50.0		50.0	4.3
		22.2		2.8	
5-10	4		2	1	3
			66.7	33.3	3.2
			16.7	1.4	
Column Total		9	12	72	93
		9.7	12.9	77.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 12

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q18

Q18→	Count	Newsweek	Time	US News	Row Total
	Row Pct	1	2	3	
Col Pct					
Q41					
Democratic	1	3		2	5
		60.0		40.0	5.7
		37.5		2.9	
Republican	2	4	7	53	64
		6.3	10.9	82.8	73.6
		50.0	70.0	76.8	
Independent	3	1	3	14	18
		5.6	16.7	77.8	20.7
		12.5	30.0	20.3	
Column Total		8	10	69	87
		9.2	11.5	79.3	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 18

19. Which news magazine is least favorable to the Army?

- (1) Newsweek
- (2) Time
- (3) U S News and World Report

Q19

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Newsweek	1	25	23.8	27.8	27.8
Time	2	57	54.3	63.3	91.1
US News	3	8	7.6	8.9	100.0
	-1	15	14.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.811	Std Err	.061	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.579	Variance	.335
Kurtosis	-.220	S E Kurt	.503	Skewness	.029
S E Skew	.254	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	163.000		

Valid Cases 90 Missing Cases 15

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q19

Q19->		Count	Newsweek	Time	US News	Row
		Row Pct				Total
		Col Pct	1	2	3	
Q32						
ROTC	1	13	29	3	45	
		28.9	64.4	6.7	51.1	
		54.2	51.8	37.5		
West Point	2	6	9		15	
		40.0	60.0		17.0	
		25.0	16.1			
OCS	3	1	14	3	18	
		5.6	77.8	16.7	20.5	
		4.2	25.0	37.5		
Column Total		24	56	8	88	
		27.3	63.6	9.1	100.0	

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q19

Q19->	Count	Newsweek	Time	US News	Row Total
	Row Pct	1	2	3	
Q38	Col Pct				
None	1	16	40	3	59
		27.1	67.8	5.1	67.0
		66.7	71.4	37.5	
1-2	2	7	12	3	22
		31.8	54.5	13.6	25.0
		29.2	21.4	37.5	
3-4	3		3	1	4
			75.0	25.0	4.5
			5.4	12.5	
5-10	4	1		1	2
		50.0		50.0	2.3
		4.2		12.5	
11-5	5		1		1
			100.0		1.1
			1.8		
Column Total		24	56	8	88
		27.3	63.6	9.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 17

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q19

Q19->	Count	Newsweek	Time	US News	Row Total
	Row Pct				
Q41	Col Pct	1	2	3	
Democratic	1		3	2	5
			60.0	40.0	6.0
			5.7	33.3	
Republican	2	18	40	3	61
		29.5	65.6	4.9	73.5
		75.0	75.5	50.0	
Independent	3	6	10	1	17
		35.3	58.8	5.9	20.5
		25.0	18.9	16.7	
	Column Total	24	53	6	83
	Total	28.9	63.9	7.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 22

20. Which of the following areas is the greatest cause of conflict between you and your counterparts in the Army/media?

- (1) organization
- (2) attitude
- (3) knowledge
- (4) training

Q20

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Organization	1	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Attitude	2	72	68.6	68.6	69.5
Knowledge	3	30	28.6	28.6	98.1
Training	4	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.314	Std Err	.051	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.525	Variance	.275
Kurtosis	.470	S E Kurt	.467	Skewness	1.001
S E Skew	.236	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	243.000		

Valid Cases 105 Missing Cases 0

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q20

Q20→	Count	Organiza	Attitude	Knowledg	Training	Row
Q32	Row Fct	tion		e		Total
	Col Fct	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1		37	16		53
			69.8	30.2		52.0
			52.9	53.3		
West Point	2		14	4		18
			77.8	22.2		17.6
			20.0	13.3		
DCS	3		12	6	1	19
			63.2	31.6	5.3	18.6
			17.1	20.0	100.0	
Column Total		1	70	30	1	102
		1.0	68.6	29.4	1.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q20

Q20→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Organiza tion	Attitude	Knowledg e	Training	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q38	0			1 100.0 3.3		1 1.0
None	1		48 69.6 67.6	20 29.0 66.7	1 1.4 100.0	69 67.0
1-2	2		19 76.0 26.8	6 24.0 20.0		25 24.3
3-4	3		4 100.0 5.6			4 3.9
5-10	4	1 33.3 100.0		2 66.7 6.7		3 2.9
11-5	5			1 100.0 3.3		1 1.0
	Column Total	1 1.0	71 68.9	30 29.1	1 1.0	103 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 2

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q20

Q20-	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Organiza tion	Attitude	Knowledge	Training	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q41						
	1		4	2		6
Democratic			66.7	33.3		6.2
			6.1	6.9		
	2		51	20		71
Republican			71.8	28.2		73.2
			77.3	69.0		
	3	1	11	7	1	20
Independent		5.0	55.0	35.0	5.0	20.6
		100.0	16.7	24.1	100.0	
	Column Total	1 1.0	66 68.0	29 29.9	1 1.0	97 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

21. What is the second greatest cause of conflict?

- (1) organization
- (2) attitude
- (3) knowledge
- (4) training

Q21

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Organization	1	4	3.8	3.8	3.8
Attitude	2	28	26.7	26.7	30.5
Knowledge	3	62	59.0	59.0	89.5
Training	4	11	10.5	10.5	100.0
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.762	Std Err	.067	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.687	Variance	.472
Kurtosis	.302	S E Kurt	.467	Skewness	-.380
S E Skew	.236	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	290.000		

Valid Cases 105 Missing Cases 0

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q21

Q21->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Organiza	Attitude	Knowledg	Training	Row Total
		tion 1	2	3	4	
Q32 ROTC	1	2 3.8 50.0	14 26.4 51.9	32 60.4 53.3	5 9.4 45.5	53 52.0
	2		3 16.7 11.1	12 66.7 20.0	3 16.7 27.3	18 17.6
	3					
OCS	1	2 10.5 50.0	5 26.3 18.5	11 57.9 18.3	1 5.3 9.1	19 18.6
	2					
	3					
Column Total		4 3.9	27 26.5	60 58.8	11 10.8	102 100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q21

Q21→	Count	Organiza	Attitude	Knowledg	Training	Row
	Row Pct	tion		e		Total
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q38						
	0		1			1
			100.0			1.0
			3.7			
	1	4	18	39	8	69
None		5.8	26.1	56.5	11.6	67.0
		100.0	66.7	63.9	72.7	
	2		6	18	1	25
1-2			24.0	72.0	4.0	24.3
			22.2	29.5	9.1	
	3			4		4
3-4				100.0		3.9
				6.6		
	4		2		1	3
5-10			66.7		33.3	2.9
			7.4		9.1	
	5				1	1
11-5					100.0	1.0
					9.1	
Column		4	27	61	11	103
Total		3.9	26.2	59.2	10.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 2

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q21

Q21→	Count	Organiza	Attitude	Knowledg	Training	Row
	Row Pct	tion		e		Total
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q41						
	1		2	4		6
Democratic			33.3	66.7		6.2
			7.4	7.0		
	2	2	16	43	10	71
Republican		2.8	22.5	60.6	14.1	73.2
		66.7	59.3	75.4	100.0	
	3	1	9	10		20
Independent		5.0	45.0	50.0		20.6
		33.3	33.3	17.5		
Column		3	27	57	10	97
Total		3.1	27.8	58.8	10.3	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 80

22. Which of the following has created the most problems for you in your relations with your counterparts?

- (1) timeliness
- (2) honesty
- (3) attitude
- (4) knowledge

Q22

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Timeliness	1	4	3.8	3.9	3.9
Honesty	2	32	30.5	31.1	35.0
Attitude	3	44	41.9	42.7	77.7
Knowledge	4	23	21.9	22.3	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.835	Std Err	.081	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.818	Variance	.669
Kurtosis	-.687	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-.124
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	292.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q22

Count		Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledge	Row Total
Q22->	Row Pct	ss	1	2	3	
Col Pct						
Q32						
ROTC	1	2	15	20	14	51
		3.9	29.4	39.2	27.5	51.0
		66.7	46.9	47.6	60.9	
West Point	2	1	6	9	2	18
		5.6	33.3	50.0	11.1	18.0
		33.3	18.8	21.4	8.7	
OCS	3		8	7	4	19
			42.1	36.8	21.1	19.0
			25.0	16.7	17.4	
Column Total		3	32	42	23	100
		3.0	32.0	42.0	23.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q22

Q22->	Count	Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledg	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct	ss 1	2	3	4	
Q38						
	0				1 100.0 4.3	1 1.0
None	1	1 1.5 33.3	21 30.9 65.6	30 44.1 69.8	16 23.5 69.6	68 67.3
1-2	2	2 8.0 66.7	6 24.0 18.8	11 44.0 25.6	6 24.0 26.1	25 24.8
3-4	3		4 100.0 12.5			4 4.0
5-10	4		1 50.0 3.1	1 50.0 2.3		2 2.0
11-5	5			1 100.0 2.3		1 1.0
	Column Total	3 3.0	32 31.7	43 42.6	23 22.8	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q22

Q22->	Count	Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledg	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct	ss 1	2	3	4	
Q41						
Democratic	1		4 66.7 12.9	1 16.7 2.6	1 16.7 4.5	6 6.3
Republican	2	3 4.3 100.0	20 29.0 64.5	30 43.5 76.9	16 23.2 72.7	69 72.6
Independent	3		7 35.0 22.6	8 40.0 20.5	5 25.0 22.7	20 21.1
	Column Total	3 3.2	31 32.6	39 41.1	22 23.2	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

23. Which is the second greatest problem?

- (1) timeliness
- (2) honesty
- (3) attitude
- (4) knowledge

Q23

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Timeliness	1	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
Honesty	2	24	22.9	23.3	28.2
Attitude	3	46	43.8	44.7	72.8
Knowledge	4	28	26.7	27.2	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.942	Std Err	.083	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.838	Variance	.702
Kurtosis	-.455	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-.398
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	303.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q23

Count		Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledge	Row Total
Q23→	Row Pct	ss	1	2	3	
	Col Pct					
Q32	1	2	14	25	11	52
	ROTC	3.8	26.9	48.1	21.2	51.5
		40.0	58.3	55.6	40.7	
West Point	2	2	9	7		18
			11.1	50.0	38.9	17.8
			8.3	20.0	25.9	
OCS	3	2	3	8	6	19
		10.5	15.8	42.1	31.6	18.8
		40.0	12.5	17.8	22.2	
Column Total		5	24	45	27	101
		5.0	23.8	44.6	26.7	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q23

		Count	Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledge	
Q23->	Row Pct	ss					Row
	Col Pct		1	2	3	4	Total
Q38							
None	1	4	17	27	21		69
		5.8	24.6	39.1	30.4		68.3
		80.0	73.9	60.0	75.0		
1-2	2	1	6	12	5		24
		4.2	25.0	50.0	20.8		23.8
		20.0	26.1	26.7	17.9		
3-4	3			4			4
				100.0			4.0
				8.9			
5-10	4			1	2		3
				33.3	66.7		3.0
				2.2	7.1		
11-5	5			1			1
				100.0			1.0
				2.2			
Column		5	23	45	28		101
Total		5.0	22.8	44.6	27.7		100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q23

Q23->	Count	Timeline	Honesty	Attitude	Knowledge	Row
	Row Pct	ss				Total
Q41	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Democratic	1	1		5		6
		16.7		83.3		6.3
		25.0		11.6		
Republican	2	3	14	30	24	71
		4.2	19.7	42.3	33.8	74.0
		75.0	66.7	69.8	85.7	
Independent	3		7	6	4	19
			36.8	42.1	21.1	19.8
			33.3	18.6	14.3	
	Column	4	21	41	28	96
	Total	4.2	21.9	44.8	29.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

24. What effect would spending more time with your counterpart organization have on potential conflict reduction?

- (1) none
- (2) little
- (3) some
- (4) great

Q24

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
None	1	6	5.7	5.7	5.7
Little	2	15	14.3	14.3	20.0
Some	3	70	66.7	66.7	86.7
Great	4	14	13.3	13.3	100.0
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.876	Std Err	.069	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.703	Variance	.494
Kurtosis	1.314	S E Kurt	.467	Skewness	-.838
S E Skew	.236	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	302.000		

Valid Cases 105 Missing Cases 0

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q24

Count		None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
Q24->	Row Pct					
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q32						
ROTC	1	1	10	34	8	53
		1.9	18.9	64.2	15.1	52.0
		20.0	71.4	49.3	57.1	
West Point	2		3	13	2	18
			16.7	72.2	11.1	17.6
			21.4	18.8	14.3	
OCS	3	1	1	13	4	19
		5.3	5.3	68.4	21.1	18.6
		20.0	7.1	18.8	28.6	
Column Total		5	14	69	14	102
Total		4.9	13.7	67.6	13.7	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q24

Q24→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q38						
	0			1 100.0 1.5		1 1.0
None	1	3 4.3 50.0	11 15.9 73.3	46 66.7 67.6	9 13.0 64.3	69 67.0
	2	2 8.0 33.3	3 12.0 20.0	17 68.0 25.0	3 12.0 21.4	25 24.3
1-2						
3-4	3		1 25.0 6.7	3 75.0 4.4		4 3.9
	4	1 33.3 16.7		1 33.3 1.5	1 33.3 7.1	3 2.9
5-10						
11-5	5				1 100.0 7.1	1 1.0
Column Total		6 5.8	15 14.6	60 66.0	14 13.6	100 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 2

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q24

Q24→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q41						
Democratic	1		1 16.7 7.7	5 83.3 7.8		6 6.2
	2	4 5.6 66.7	9 12.7 69.2	45 63.4 70.3	13 18.3 92.9	71 73.2
Republican						
	3	2 10.0 33.3	3 15.0 23.1	14 70.0 21.9	1 5.0 7.1	20 20.6
Independent						
Column Total		6 6.2	13 13.4	64 66.0	14 14.4	97 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

25. What is your supervisor's attitude toward your counterpart organization?

- (1) very negative
- (2) negative
- (3) neutral
- (4) positive
- (5) very positive

Q25

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very Negative	1	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Negative	2	36	34.3	35.6	36.6
Neutral	3	44	41.9	43.6	80.2
Positive	4	20	19.0	19.8	100.0
	-1	4	3.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.822	Std Err	.075	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.754	Variance	.568
Kurtosis	-.919	S E Kurt	.476	Skewness	.165
S E Skew	.240	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	285.000		

Valid Cases 101 Missing Cases 4

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q25

Q25->	Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
Q32	Row Pct	ative				
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1		17	23	11	51
			33.3	45.1	21.6	51.5
			48.6	53.5	55.0	
West Point	2		8	7	2	17
			47.1	41.2	11.8	17.2
			22.9	16.3	10.0	
OCS	3	1	6	8	4	19
		5.3	31.6	42.1	21.1	19.2
		100.0	17.1	18.6	20.0	
Column Total		1	35	43	20	99
	Total	1.0	35.4	43.4	20.2	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q25

Q25→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q38						
None	1	1	25	31	12	69
		1.4	36.2	44.9	17.4	69.7
		100.0	71.4	72.1	60.0	
1-2	2		6	10	7	23
			26.1	43.5	30.4	23.2
			17.1	23.3	35.0	
3-4	3		2	1	1	4
			50.0	25.0	25.0	4.0
			5.7	2.3	5.0	
5-10	4		2	1		3
			66.7	33.3		3.0
			5.7	2.3		
Column Total		1	35	43	20	99
		1.0	35.4	43.4	20.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 6

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q25

Q25→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q41						
Democratic	1		2	3	1	6
			33.3	50.0	16.7	6.5
			6.5	7.1	5.3	
Republican	2	1	25	28	14	68
		1.5	36.8	41.2	20.6	73.1
		100.0	80.6	66.7	73.7	
Independent	3		4	11	4	19
			21.1	57.9	21.1	20.4
			12.9	26.2	21.1	
Column Total		1	31	42	19	93
		1.1	33.3	45.2	20.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 12

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
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
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26. What do you believe is your organization's view of your counterpart?

- (1) very negative
- (2) negative
- (3) neutral
- (4) positive
- (5) very positive

Q26

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very Negative	1	4	3.8	3.9	3.9
Negative	2	57	54.3	55.3	59.2
Neutral	3	28	26.7	27.2	86.4
Positive	4	14	13.3	13.6	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.505	Std Err	.077	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.778	Variance	.605
Kurtosis	-.370	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	.620
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	258.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q26

Count		Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
Q26->	Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q32 ROTC	1	3	26	15	8	52
		5.8	50.0	28.8	15.4	52.0
		75.0	46.4	57.7	57.1	
West Point	2	1	12	3	2	18
		5.6	66.7	16.7	11.1	18.0
		25.0	21.4	11.5	14.3	
OCS	3		11	5	2	18
			61.1	27.8	11.1	18.0
			19.6	19.2	14.3	
Column Total		4	56	26	14	100
		4.0	56.0	26.0	14.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q26

Q26→		Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
Q38		Row Pct	ative				
		Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
None	0			1 100.0 1.8			1 1.0
	1		2 2.9 50.0	43 62.3 76.8	15 21.7 55.6	9 13.0 64.3	69 68.3
	2			10 43.5 17.9	9 39.1 33.3	4 17.4 28.6	23 22.8
3-4	3			2 50.0 3.6	1 25.0 3.7	1 25.0 7.1	4 4.0
	4		1 33.3 25.0		2 66.7 7.4		3 3.0
	5		1 100.0 25.0				1 1.0
Column Total			4 4.0	56 55.4	27 26.7	14 13.9	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q26

Q26→		Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
Q41		Row Pct	ative				
		Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Democratic	1			4 66.7 7.4	1 16.7 4.0	1 16.7 7.7	6 6.3
	2		3 4.3 75.0	41 58.6 75.9	16 22.9 64.0	10 14.3 76.9	70 72.9
	3		1 5.0 25.0	9 45.0 16.7	8 40.0 32.0	2 10.0 15.4	20 20.8
Column Total			4 4.2	54 56.3	25 26.0	13 13.5	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

27. How many times have you been misquoted (Army) or accused of misquoting (media) by your counterparts?

- (1) never
- (2) once
- (3) twice
- (4) three to four times
- (5) five or more times

Q27

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Never	1	56	53.3	53.8	53.8
Once	2	18	17.1	17.3	71.2
Twice	3	15	14.3	14.4	85.6
3-4 times	4	14	13.3	13.5	99.0
5 or more times	5	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	1	1.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.904	Std Err	.112	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.145	Variance	1.711
Kurtosis	-.568	S E Kurt	.469	Skewness	.904
S E Skew	.237	Range	4.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	198.000		

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Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q27

Q27->		Count	Never	Once	Twice	3-4 times	5 or more times	Row Total
		Row Pct						
		Col Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
Q32								
ROTC	1		35	7	4	7		53
			66.0	13.2	7.5	13.2		52.5
			63.6	38.9	28.6	53.8		
West Point	2		8	4	3	2	1	18
			44.4	22.2	16.7	11.1	5.6	17.8
			14.5	22.2	21.4	15.4	100.0	
DCS	3		8	4	4	2		18
			44.4	22.2	22.2	11.1		17.8
			14.5	22.2	28.6	15.4		
Column Total			55	18	14	13	1	101
Total			54.5	17.8	13.9	12.9	1.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q27

Q27→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Never	Once	Twice	3-4 times	5 or more times	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q38	0		1 100.0 5.6				1 1.0
None	1	40 58.8 74.1	12 17.6 66.7	8 11.8 53.3	8 11.8 57.1		68 66.7
	2	11 44.0 20.4	4 16.0 22.2	3 12.0 20.0	6 24.0 42.9	1 4.0 100.0	25 24.5
	3	1 25.0 1.9	1 25.0 5.6	2 50.0 13.3			4 3.9
5-10	4	2 66.7 3.7		1 33.3 6.7			3 2.9
	5			1 100.0 6.7			1 1.0
Column Total		54 52.9	18 17.6	15 14.7	14 13.7	1 1.0	102 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q27

Q27→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Never	Once	Twice	3-4 times	5 or more times	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q41	1	3 50.0 5.8	1 16.7 5.9	2 33.3 14.3			6 6.3
Democratic	2	40 56.3 76.9	11 15.5 64.7	11 15.5 78.6	9 12.7 75.0		71 74.0
	3	9 47.4 17.3	5 26.3 29.4	1 5.3 7.1	3 15.8 25.0	1 5.3 100.0	19 19.8
Column Total		52 54.2	17 17.7	14 14.6	12 12.5	1 1.0	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

28. How much current knowledge about your organization do you believe your counterparts hold?

- (1) none
- (2) little
- (3) some
- (4) great

Q28

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
None	1	5	4.8	4.9	4.9
Little	2	63	60.0	61.2	66.0
Some	3	31	29.5	30.1	96.1
Great	4	4	3.8	3.9	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.330	Std Err	.062	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.632	Variance	.400
Kurtosis	.406	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	.550
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	240.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q28

Q28	Count	None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
Q32	Row Pct	1	2	3	4	
	Col Pct					
ROTC	1	2 3.8 50.0	31 59.6 49.2	19 36.5 65.5		52 52.0
West Point	2		14 77.8 22.2	3 16.7 10.3	1 5.6 25.0	18 18.0
OCS	3	1 5.6 25.0	13 72.2 20.6	2 11.1 6.9	2 11.1 50.0	18 18.0
	Column Total	4 4.0	63 63.0	29 29.0	4 4.0	100 100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q28

Q28→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q38						
None	1	4 5.9 100.0	41 60.3 65.1	21 30.9 70.0	2 2.9 50.0	68 67.3
	2		18 72.0 28.6	6 24.0 20.0	1 4.0 25.0	25 24.8
	3		2 50.0 3.2	2 50.0 6.7		4 4.0
5-10	4		2 66.7 3.2	1 33.3 3.3		3 3.0
	5				1 100.0 25.0	1 1.0
Column Total		4 4.0	63 62.4	30 29.7	4 4.0	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q28

Q28→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	None	Little	Some	Great	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	
Q41						
Democratic	1		4 66.7 6.6	2 33.3 7.4		6 6.3
	2	4 5.6 100.0	44 62.0 72.1	20 28.2 74.1	3 4.2 100.0	71 74.7
Independent	3		13 72.2 21.3	5 27.8 18.5		18 18.9
Column Total		4 4.2	61 64.2	27 28.4	3 3.2	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

29. What effect does the amount of time you must spend dealing with your counterparts have on your relationship?

- (1) very negative
- (2) negative
- (3) none
- (4) positive
- (5) very positive

Q29

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very Negative	1	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Negative	2	9	8.6	8.8	9.8
None	3	45	42.9	44.1	57.9
Positive	4	45	42.9	44.1	92.0
Very Positive	5	2	1.9	2.0	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.373	Std Err	.071	Median	3.000
Mode	3.000	Std Dev	.716	Variance	.513
Kurtosis	.318	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	-.528
S E Skew	.239	Range	4.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	344.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q29

		Count	Very Neg	Negative	None	Positive	Very Pos	
Q29-	Row Pct	ative					itive	Row
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	5		Total
Q32								
	1		4	23	23	1		51
ROTC			7.8	45.1	45.1	2.0		51.5
			44.4	53.5	52.3	50.0		
	2		1	10	6	1		18
West Point			5.6	55.6	33.3	5.6		18.2
			11.1	23.3	13.6	50.0		
	3	1	2	5	10			18
OCS		5.6	11.1	27.8	55.6			18.2
		100.0	22.2	11.6	22.7			
	Column	1	9	43	44	2		99
	Total	1.0	9.1	43.4	44.4	2.0		100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q29

Q29→	Count	Very Neg	Negative	None	Positive	Very Pos	Row
Q38	Row Pct	ative				itive	Total
	Col Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
None	1	1	8	35	23		67
		1.5	11.9	52.2	34.3		67.0
		100.0	88.9	79.5	52.3		
1-2	2		1	7	17		25
			4.0	28.0	68.0		25.0
			11.1	15.9	38.6		
3-4	3			1	2	1	4
				25.0	50.0	25.0	4.0
				2.3	4.5	50.0	
5-10	4			1	2		3
				33.3	66.7		3.0
				2.3	4.5		
11-5	5					1	1
						100.0	1.0
						50.0	
Column		1	9	44	44	2	100
Total		1.0	9.0	44.0	44.0	2.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q29

Q29→	Count	Negative	None	Positive	Very Pos	Row
Q41	Row Pct				itive	Total
	Col Pct	2	3	4	5	
Democratic	1	1	2	3		6
		16.7	33.3	50.0		6.4
		11.1	4.7	7.5		
Republican	2	6	34	28	2	70
		8.6	48.6	40.0	2.9	74.5
		66.7	79.1	70.0	100.0	
Independent	3	2	7	9		18
		11.1	38.9	50.0		19.1
		22.2	16.3	22.5		
Column		9	43	40	2	94
Total		9.6	45.7	42.6	2.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 11

30. How much formal training did your employer provide about your counterpart organization?

- (1) none
- (2) less than one day
- (3) one to three days
- (4) four to seven days
- (5) more than seven days

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	2	1.9	2.0	2.0
None	1	49	46.7	48.5	50.5
LT 1 Day	2	21	20.0	20.8	71.3
1-3 Days	3	21	20.0	20.8	92.1
4-7 Days	4	2	1.9	2.0	94.1
Over 7 Days	5	6	5.7	5.9	100.0
	-1	4	3.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.901	Std Err	.117	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.179	Variance	1.390
Kurtosis	.651	S E Kurt	.476	Skewness	1.092
S E Skew	.240	Range	5.000	Minimum	0.0
Maximum	5.000	Sum	192.000		

Valid Cases 101 Missing Cases 4

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q30

Count		None						Row Total
Q30→	Row Pct Col Pct	0	1	2	3	4	5	
Q32								
ROTC	1		30	8	10		5	53
			56.6	15.1	18.9		9.4	54.1
			61.2	40.0	50.0		63.3	
West Point	2	1	6	4	4	1	1	17
		5.9	35.3	23.5	23.5	5.9	5.9	17.3
		100.0	12.2	20.0	20.0	50.0	16.7	
OCS	3		8	3	5			16
			50.0	18.8	31.3			16.3
			16.3	15.0	25.0			
Direct	4		5	5		1		11
			45.5	45.5		9.1		11.2
			10.2	25.0		50.0		
	5				1			1
					100.0			1.0
					5.0			
Column Total		1	49	20	20	2	6	98
		1.0	50.0	20.4	20.4	2.0	6.1	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q30

Q30→	Count Row Fct Col Fct	None					LT 1 Day		1-3 Days		4-7 Days		Over 7 Days		Row Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5								
Q38															
	0				1				100.0						1
					5.0										1.0
None	1	1	36	12	14		3								66
		1.5	54.5	18.2	21.2		4.5								66.7
		50.0	73.5	60.0	70.0		50.0								
1-2	2	1	11	6	2	1	3								24
		4.2	45.8	25.0	8.3	4.2	12.5								24.2
		50.0	22.4	30.0	10.0	50.0	50.0								
3-4	3		1	1	2										4
			25.0	25.0	50.0										4.0
			2.0	5.0	10.0										
5-10	4		1	1	1										3
			33.3	33.3	33.3										3.0
			2.0	5.0	5.0										
11-5	5					1									1
						100.0									1.0
						50.0									
Column		2	49	20	20	2	6								99
(Continued) Total		2.0	49.5	20.2	20.2	2.0	6.1								100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 6

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q30

Q30→	Count Row Fct Col Fct	None					LT 1 Day		1-3 Days		4-7 Days		Over 7 Days		Row Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5								
Q41															
Democratic	1		3	1	1		1								6
			50.0	16.7	16.7		16.7								6.7
			6.4	5.3	5.3		20.0								
Republican	2	2	36	13	13	2	3								65
		2.9	52.2	18.8	18.8	2.9	4.3								71.4
		100.0	76.6	68.4	68.4	100.0	60.0								
Independent	3		8	5	5		1								19
			42.1	26.3	26.3		5.3								20.2
			17.0	26.7	26.3		20.0								
Column		2	47	19	19	2	5								94
(Continued) Total		2.1	50.0	20.2	20.2	2.1	5.3								100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 98 11

31. What is your view of your counterpart organization?

- (1) very negative
- (2) negative
- (3) neutral
- (4) positive
- (5) very positive

Q31

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum. Percent
Very Negative	1	7	6.7	6.9	6.9
Negative	2	45	42.9	44.1	51.0
Neutral	3	37	35.2	36.3	87.3
Positive	4	13	12.4	12.7	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.549	Std Err	.080	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.804	Variance	.649
Kurtosis	-.485	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	.187
S E Skew	.239	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	260.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q31

Q31 \ Q32	Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
	Row Fct	ative				
	Col Fct	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1	4	19	20	9	52
		7.7	36.5	38.5	17.3	52.5
		66.7	42.2	57.1	69.2	
West Point	2	2	8	8		18
		11.1	44.4	44.4		18.2
		33.3	17.8	22.9		
OCS	3		10	5	2	17
			58.8	29.4	11.8	17.2
			22.2	14.3	15.4	
Column Total		6	45	35	13	99
	Total	6.1	45.5	35.4	13.1	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q31

Q31-Q38	Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct	ative 1	2	3	4	
Q38	1	5 7.5 83.3	34 50.7 77.3	20 29.9 54.1	8 11.9 61.5	67 67.0
	2		8 32.0 18.2	13 52.0 35.1	4 16.0 30.8	25 25.0
	3		1 25.0 2.3	2 50.0 5.4	1 25.0 7.7	4 4.0
	4		1 33.3 2.3	2 66.7 5.4		3 3.0
	5	1 100.0 16.7				1 1.0
Column Total		6 6.0	44 44.0	37 37.0	13 13.0	100 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 5

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q31

Q31-Q41	Count	Very Neg	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct	ative 1	2	3	4	
Q41	1		2 33.3 4.8	3 50.0 8.6	1 16.7 8.3	6 6.3
	2	5 7.0 83.3	33 46.5 78.6	24 33.3 68.6	9 12.7 75.0	71 74.7
	3	1 5.6 16.7	7 38.9 16.7	8 44.4 22.9	2 11.1 16.7	18 18.9
Column Total		6 6.3	42 44.2	35 36.7	12 12.6	95 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 10

32. Answer this question only if you are an Army officer.
What is your source of commission?

- (1) ROTC
 - (2) West Point
 - (3) OCS
 - (4) Direct
 - (5) other _____
- (please write in source)

Q32

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ROTC	1	53	50.5	52.0	52.0
West Point	2	18	17.1	17.6	69.6
OCS	3	19	18.1	18.6	88.2
Direct	4	11	10.5	10.8	99.0
	5	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	3	2.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.912	Std Err	.110	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	1.109	Variance	1.230
Kurtosis	-.566	S E Kurt	.474	Skewness	.844
S E Skew	.239	Range	4.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	195.000		

Valid Cases 102 Missing Cases 3

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q32

Q32->		Count	ROTC	West Poi	OCS	Direct		Row
		Row Fct		Int				Total
		Col Fct	1	2	3	4	5	
Q32								
ROTC	1		53					53
			100.0					52.0
			100.0					
West Point	2			18				18
				100.0				17.6
				100.0				
OCS	3				19			19
					100.0			18.6
					100.0			
Column			53	18	19	11	1	102
Total			52.0	17.6	18.6	10.8	1.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q32

Q32->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	ROTC 1	West Poi Int 2	OCS 3	Direct 4	5	Row Total
Q38	0	1 100.0 1.9					1 1.0
None	1	36 52.2 67.9	12 17.4 66.7	16 23.2 84.2	4 5.8 40.0	1 1.4 100.0	69 68.3
1-2	2	12 52.2 22.6	5 21.7 27.8	2 8.7 10.5	4 17.4 40.0		23 22.8
3-4	3	3 75.0 5.7		1 25.0 5.3			4 4.0
5-10	4	1 33.3 1.9			2 66.7 20.0		3 3.0
11-5	5		1 100.0 5.6				1 1.0
	Column Total	53 52.5	18 17.8	19 18.8	10 9.9	1 1.0	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q32

Q32-	Count Row Pct Col Pct	ROTC 1	West Poi Int	DCS 2	Direct 3	4	5	Row Total
Q41								
	1	4 66.7 7.7		2 33.3 12.5				6 6.3
Democratic								
	2	38 54.3 73.1	15 21.4 88.2	10 14.3 62.5	6 8.6 60.0	1 1.4 100.0		70 72.9
Republican								
	3	10 50.0 19.2	2 10.0 11.8	4 20.0 25.0	4 20.0 40.0			20 20.8
Independent								
	Column Total	52 54.2	17 17.7	16 16.7	10 10.4	1 1.0		96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

33. Answer this question only if you are an Army officer.
Which best describes your current (or last) duty assignment?

- (1) commander
- (2) staff officer
- (3) public information officer
- (4) other

(please write in title)

Q33

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Commander	1	64	61.0	62.1	62.1
Staff Officer	2	34	32.4	33.0	95.1
	4	5	4.8	4.9	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.476	Std Err	.073	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	.739	Variance	.546
Kurtosis	4.195	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	1.544
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	152.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q33

Q33→		Count	Commander	Staff Officer	Other	Row Total
Q32		Row Pct	1	2	4	
		Col Pct				
ROTC	1		31	18	4	53
			58.5	34.0	7.5	52.5
			48.4	56.3	80.0	
West Point	2		11	7		18
			61.1	38.9		17.8
			17.2	21.9		
OCS	3		13	4	1	18
			72.2	22.2	5.6	17.8
			20.3	12.5	20.0	
Column Total			64	32	5	101
			63.4	31.7	5.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q33

Q33->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Commander	Staff Officer	4	Row Total
		1	2		
Q38	0		1 100.0 2.9		1 1.0
None	1	43 63.2 68.3	23 33.8 67.6	2 2.9 40.0	68 66.7
	2	15 60.0 23.8	8 32.0 23.5	2 8.0 40.0	25 24.5
	3	3 75.0 4.8		1 25.0 20.0	4 3.9
5-10	4	1 33.3 1.6	2 66.7 5.9		3 2.9
	5	1 100.0 1.6			1 1.0
Column Total		63 61.8	34 33.3	5 4.9	102 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q33

Q33->	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Commander 1	Staff Officer 2	4	Row Total
Q41					
	1	5 83.3 8.5		1 16.7 25.0	6 6.3
Democratic					
	2	41 58.6 69.5	28 40.0 84.8	1 1.4 25.0	70 72.9
Republican					
	3	13 65.0 22.0	5 25.0 15.2	2 10.0 50.0	20 20.8
Independent					
	Column Total	59 61.5	33 34.4	4 4.2	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9
104

34. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your medium?

- (1) national TV
- (2) national radio
- (3) national print
- (4) state/local TV
- (5) state/local radio
- (6) state/local print

35. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your duty assignment?

- (1) reporter
- (2) commentator
- (3) writer
- (4) editor
- (5) administrator
- (6) other

(please write in title)

34. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your medium?

- (1) national TV
- (2) national radio
- (3) national print
- (4) state/local TV
- (5) state/local radio
- (6) state/local print

35. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your duty assignment?

- (1) reporter
- (2) commentator
- (3) writer
- (4) editor
- (5) administrator
- (6) other

(please write in title)

36. How many years experience do you have in your profession?

- (1) 0-5
- (2) 6-10
- (3) 11-15
- (4) 16-20
- (5) 21-25
- (6) 26 or more

Q36

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0-5	1	3	2.9	2.9	2.9
11-15	3	1	1.0	1.0	3.9
16-20	4	42	40.0	40.8	44.7
21-25	5	54	51.4	52.4	97.1
Over 26	6	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.485	Std Err	.081	Median	5.000
Mode	5.000	Std Dev	.827	Variance	.684
Kurtosis	7.356	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-2.075
S E Skew	.238	Range	5.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	6.000	Sum	462.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q36

Q36->		Count	10-5	16-20	21-25	Over 26	Row Total
Q32		Row Pct					
		Col Pct	1	4	5	6	
ROTC	1		1	21	29	2	53
			1.9	39.6	54.7	3.8	52.5
			33.3	50.0	54.7	66.7	
West Point	2		1	8	8		17
			5.9	47.1	47.1		16.8
			33.3	19.0	15.1		
OCS	3		1	5	12	1	19
			5.3	26.3	63.2	5.3	18.8
			33.3	11.9	22.6	33.3	
Column Total			3	42	53	3	101
			3.0	41.6	52.5	3.0	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q36

Q36→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	0-5	11-15	16-20	21-25	Over 26	Row Total
		1	3	4	5	6	
Q38							
	0			1 100.0 2.4			1 1.0
None	1			29 42.0 70.7	38 55.1 70.4	2 2.9 66.7	69 67.6
1-2	2	2 8.0 66.7	1 4.0 100.0	9 36.0 22.0	13 52.0 24.1		25 24.5
3-4	3	1 25.0 33.3		1 25.0 2.4	1 25.0 1.9	1 25.0 33.3	4 3.9
5-10	4			1 33.3 2.4	2 66.7 3.7		3 2.9
	Column Total	3 2.9	1 1.0	41 40.2	54 52.9	3 2.9	102 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q36

Q36→	Count Row Pct Col Pct	16-20	21-25	Over 26	Row Total
		4	5	6	
Q41					
Democratic	1	2 33.3 5.1	3 50.0 5.6	1 16.7 33.3	6 6.3
Republican	2	30 42.9 76.9	38 54.3 70.4	2 2.9 66.7	70 72.9
Independent	3	7 35.0 17.9	13 65.0 24.1		20 20.8
	Column Total	39 40.6	54 56.3	3 3.1	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

37. Which of the following best describes your level of formal education?

- (1) high school graduate
- (2) college/university, two years or less
- (3) college/university, more than two years
- (4) college/university graduate
- (5) advanced degree

Q37

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
2 Yrs College	2	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Over 2 Yrs College	3	1	1.0	1.0	2.0
College Graduate	4	14	13.3	13.9	15.8
Advanced Degree	5	85	81.0	84.2	100.0
	-1	4	3.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.812	Std Err	.048	Median	5.000
Mode	5.000	Std Dev	.484	Variance	.234
Kurtosis	12.287	S E Kurt	.476	Skewness	-3.157
S E Skew	.240	Range	3.000	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	5.000	Sum	486.000		

Valid Cases 101 Missing Cases 4

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q37

		Count	12 Yrs Col	Over 2 Yr	College	Advanced	
Q37->	Row Pct	llege	rs Colle	Graduate	Degree		Row
	Col Pct	2	3	4	5		Total
Q32							
	1	1		6	44		51
ROTC		2.0		11.8	86.3		51.5
		100.0		46.2	52.4		
	2			1	17		18
West Point				5.6	94.4		18.2
				7.7	20.2		
	3			4	15		19
OCS				21.1	78.9		19.2
				30.8	17.9		
	Column	1	1	13	84		99
	Total	1.0	1.0	13.1	84.8		100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q37

Q37→	Count	12 Yrs Co llege	Over 2 Y rs Colle	College Graduate	Advanced Degree	Row Total
		2	3	4	5	
Q38						
	0				1 100.0 1.2	1 1.0
None	1			5 7.2 35.7	64 92.8 75.3	69 68.3
1-2	2	1 4.2 100.0		7 29.2 50.0	16 66.7 18.8	24 23.8
3-4	3			1 33.3 7.1	2 66.7 2.4	3 3.0
5-10	4		1 33.3 100.0	1 33.3 7.1	1 33.3 1.2	3 3.0
11-5	5				1 100.0 1.2	1 1.0
	Column Total	1 1.0	1 1.0	14 13.9	85 84.2	101 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 4

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q37

Q37→	Count	12 Yrs Co llege	Over 2 Y rs Colle	College Graduate	Advanced Degree	Row Total
		2	3	4	5	
Q41						
Democratic	1				6 100.0 7.2	6 6.3
Republican	2	1 1.4 100.0		10 14.3 90.9	59 84.3 71.1	70 72.9
Independent	3		1 5.0 100.0	1 5.0 9.1	18 90.0 21.7	20 20.8
	Column Total	1 1.0	1 1.0	11 11.5	83 84.5	96 100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 9

38. Which of the following best describes the number of hours per week you are involved with your counterparts?

- (1) none
- (2) 1/2
- (3) 3/4
- (4) 5/10
- (5) 11/15
- (6) 16/20
- (7) more than 20

Q38

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
None	1	69	65.7	67.0	68.0
1-2	2	25	23.8	24.3	92.2
3-4	3	4	3.8	3.9	96.1
5-10	4	3	2.9	2.9	99.0
11-5	5	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.437	Std Err	.079	Median	1.000
Mode	1.000	Std Dev	.800	Variance	.641
Kurtosis	5.115	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	2.082
S E Skew	.238	Range	5.000	Minimum	0.0
Maximum	5.000	Sum	148.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q38

Count		None		1-2		3-4		5-10		Row Total
Q38→	Row Pct									
Q32	Col Pct	0	1	2	3	4				
ROTC	1	1	36	12	3	1			53	
		1.9	67.9	22.6	5.7	1.9			52.5	
		100.0	52.2	52.2	75.0	33.3				
West Point	2		12	5					18	
			66.7	27.8					17.8	
			17.4	21.7						
OCS	3		16	2	1				19	
			84.2	10.5	5.3				18.8	
			23.2	8.7	25.0					
Column Total		1	69	23	4	3			101	
Total		1.0	68.3	22.6	4.0	3.0			100.0	

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q38

Q38-Q41	Count Row Pct Col Pct	None					1-2					3-4					5-10					11-S					Row Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
Q41																											
Democratic	1		3	1	2																						6
			50.0	16.7	33.3																						6.2
			4.5	4.5	6.7																						
Republican	2		51	16	1	2	1																				71
			71.8	22.5	1.4	2.8	1.4																				73.2
			76.1	72.7	33.3	66.7	100.0																				
Independent	3	1	13	5		1																					20
		5.0	65.0	25.0		5.0																					20.6
		100.0	19.4	22.7		33.3																					
Column Total		1	67	22	3	3	1																				97
		1.0	69.1	22.7	3.1	3.1	1.0																				100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

39. Your age is?

- (1) less than 21
- (2) 21-29
- (3) 30-39
- (4) 40-49
- (5) 50-59
- (6) 60 or greater

Q39

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Under 21	1	2	1.9	1.9	1.9
21-29	2	3	2.9	2.9	4.9
30-39	3	5	4.8	4.9	9.7
40-49	4	93	88.6	90.3	100.0
	-1	2	1.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.835	Std Err	.055	Median	4.000
Mode	4.000	Std Dev	.562	Variance	.316
Kurtosis	14.204	S E Kurt	.472	Skewness	-3.755
S E Skew	.238	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	395.000		

Valid Cases 103 Missing Cases 2

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q39

Count		Under 21	21-29	30-39	40-49	Row Total
Q39	Q32	1	2	3	4	
ROTC	1			3	49	52
				5.8	94.2	51.5
West Point	2	1	1		16	18
		5.6	5.6		88.9	17.8
OCS	3		1	2	16	19
			5.3	10.5	84.2	18.8
Column Total		2	2	5	92	101
		2.0	2.0	5.0	91.1	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q39

Q39→	Count	Under 21	21-29	30-39	40-49	Row Total
	Row Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q38	Col Pct					
0					1	1
					100.0	1.0
					1.1	
1				3	66	69
None				4.3	95.7	67.6
				60.0	71.0	
2			3	2	20	25
1-2			12.0	8.0	80.0	24.5
			100.0	40.0	21.5	
3					3	3
3-4					100.0	2.9
					3.2	
4					3	3
5-10					100.0	2.9
					3.2	
5		1				1
11-5		100.0				1.0
		100.0				
Column Total		1	3	5	93	102
		1.0	2.9	4.9	91.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 3

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q39

Q39→	Count	Under 21	30-39	40-49	Row Total
	Row Pct	1	3	4	
Q41	Col Pct				
1				6	6
Democratic				100.0	6.2
				6.6	
2		1	5	65	71
Republican		1.4	7.0	91.5	73.2
		100.0	100.0	71.4	
3				20	20
Independent				100.0	20.6
				22.0	
Column Total		1	5	91	97
		1.0	5.2	93.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 114 6

40. Your sex is?

- (1) female
- (2) male

Q40

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Female	1	6	5.7	6.0	6.0
Male	2	92	87.6	92.0	98.0
	3	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
	4	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
	-1	5	4.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.970	Std Err	.033	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.332	Variance	.110
Kurtosis	17.603	S E Kurt	.478	Skewness	1.123
S E Skew	.241	Range	3.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	4.000	Sum	197.000		

Valid Cases 100 Missing Cases 5

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q40

		Count	Female	Male				
Q40=	Q32	Row Pct	1	2	3	4	Row Total	
		Col Pct						
	1		2	50			52	
ROTC			3.8	96.2			52.5	
			33.3	54.9				
	2		1	15		1	17	
West Point			5.9	88.2		5.9	17.2	
			16.7	16.5		100.0		
	3		1	17			18	
OCS			5.6	94.4			18.2	
			16.7	18.7				
Column Total			6	91	1	1	99	
			6.1	91.9	1.0	1.0	100.0	

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q40

Q40→		Count	Female	Male		
		Row Pct				Row Total
Q38		Col Pct	1	2	4	
	0			1		1
				100.0		1.0
				1.1		
None	1		5	64		69
			7.2	92.8		69.7
			83.3	69.6		
1-2	2		1	21		22
			4.5	95.5		22.2
			16.7	22.8		
3-4	3			3		3
				100.0		3.0
				3.3		
5-10	4			3		3
				100.0		3.0
				3.3		
11-5	5				1	1
					100.0	1.0
					100.0	
Column Total			6	92	1	99
			6.1	92.9	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 6

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q40

Q40→	Count	Female		Male		Row Total
	Row Pct	1		2		
Q41	Col Pct					
Democratic	1	1	5			6
		16.7	83.3			6.2
		16.7	5.6			
Republican	2	3	67	1		71
		4.2	94.4	1.4		73.2
		50.0	74.4	100.0		
Independent	3	2	18			20
		10.0	90.0			20.6
		33.3	20.0			
Column Total		6	90	1		97
Total		6.2	92.8	1.0		100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

41. Which best describes your political leanings?

- (1) Democratic
- (2) Republican
- (3) Independent

Q41

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Democratic	1	6	5.7	6.2	6.2
Republican	2	71	67.6	73.2	79.4
Independent	3	20	19.0	20.6	100.0
	-1	8	7.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		105	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.144	Std Err	.051	Median	2.000
Mode	2.000	Std Dev	.500	Variance	.250
Kurtosis	.643	S E Kurt	.485	Skewness	.263
S E Skew	.245	Range	2.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	3.000	Sum	208.000		

Valid Cases 97 Missing Cases 8

Crosstabulation: Q32
By Q41

Q41->		Count	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Row Total
Q32		Row Pct	ic	lan	ent	
		Col Pct	1	2	3	
ROTC	1		4	38	10	52
			7.7	73.1	19.2	54.2
			66.7	54.3	50.0	
West Point	2			15	2	17
				88.2	11.8	17.7
				21.4	10.0	
DCS	3		2	10	4	16
			12.5	62.5	25.0	16.7
			33.3	14.3	20.0	
Column Total			6	70	20	96
		Total	6.3	72.9	20.8	100.0

Crosstabulation: Q38
By Q41

Q41→	Count	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Row Total
Q38	Row Pct	ic	an	ent	
	Col Pct	1	2	3	
0				1	1
				100.0	1.0
				5.0	
1		3	51	13	67
None		4.5	76.1	19.4	69.1
		50.0	71.8	65.0	
2		1	16	5	22
1-2		4.5	72.7	22.7	22.7
		16.7	22.5	25.0	
3		2	1		3
3-4		66.7	33.3		3.1
		33.3	1.4		
4			2	1	3
5-10			66.7	33.3	3.1
			2.8	5.0	
5			1		1
11-5			100.0		1.0
			1.4		
Column Total		6	71	20	97
		6.2	73.2	20.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

Crosstabulation: Q41
By Q41

Q41→	Count	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Row Total
Q41	Row Pct	ic	an	ent	
	Col Pct	1	2	3	
1		6			6
Democratic		100.0			6.2
		100.0			
2			71		71
Republican			100.0		73.2
			100.0		
3				20	20
Independent				100.0	20.6
				100.0	
Column Total		6	71	20	97
		6.2	73.2	20.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 8

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FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE TAKEN FROM A SURVEY DISTRIBUTED TO US ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS DURING APRIL 1986. 105 US ARMY STUDENTS RESPONDED.

THE QUESTION ASKED WAS: "PLEASE INDICATE YOUR VIEW ON THE CHIEF CAUSE(S) OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MEDIA."

I do not like the PAO! Commanders need to be able to communicate with the media but must be taught how to do so.

Basic difference in aims, goals, and personal (individual) values.

Lack of understanding by both sides which degrades confidence in each organization.

Lack of balance in presentation. Presenting of opinion as fact.

Points of view. Perspective. The media shades/prints news that follows popular public sentiment. The military sees only one point of view, ours; and is exquisitely "hung up" on terminology, precision, and secrecy.

The media is interested more in profit than the absolute truth. "If it sells, print it; if it don't sell, can it!" Generally, good news doesn't sell; therefore, the only time the military is covered is when something stinks!

The media's attitude towards reporting the sensational rather than reporting the factual; i.e., low (very low) professional integrity.

Press people feel they ought to be the judge of whether a piece of information is releasable once they get it, regardless of how they got it or what the topic is.

Lack of knowledge on the part of the media. Media focus on "selling" the news rather than objective reporting. Lack of a cohesive, consistent national strategy which forces the Army into a "knee-jerk;" constantly changing a series of programs.

The media gear themselves towards sensationalism. The views rendered by the likes of Dan Rather, Ted Koppel, etc., are extremely subjective and sometimes do not align well with what the "news" really is (e.g., Koppel's analysis of the shuttle disaster - he was explaining precise causes with little or no information available).

The media are interested in sensational stories that sell. The Army wants favorable press on everything.

The media lack the intricate, detailed knowledge of the military to report it properly and factually. The military is a complex, technical society understood by few outsiders.

Distrust is based on inaccurate and/or unbalanced presentation.
Poor media research - lack of contextual accuracy.

The media are self serving and will report only what is sensational in order to sell a story. Stating the reason for an event without having full knowledge of the facts.

Media focus is what is wrong - find to attribute blame - communication limited to one side of story - simplification of complex issues misleads - will not clarify story when they have misled audience.

Should report both sides of an issue - less bias.

Media representatives are ignorant of strategy, geo-politics and procurement procedures.

- 1) Media looking for a story whether one exists or not.
- 2) Bias on part of media (preconceived notions)
- 3) News is competitive and newspaper/TV's success is reflected in bottom line of corporate profits. Pressure is on media to produce interesting/attention-grabbing news. Some newsmen allow this pressure to influence their reporting.

Media are profit organizations, consequently, they are in competition with each other. Sensationalism sells better than dry factual information.

The lack of honest, objective reporting. The failure by the press to cover the positive aspects of the U.S. Army while looking for the negative continually.

Distrust of media representatives whose sole purpose is to get a "hot" story regardless of the consequences concerned with release of the information. There appears to be little concern for people or organizations in the way the media will exploit any situation to get one-up on each other.

Distrust of each other - natural suspicion of base motives: incomplete knowledge of the other and "partial" views.

A complete difference in attitude and motivation. We are concerned with the nation's security. They are concerned with making money! A big story - regardless of its adverse effects.

Honesty and integrity of the media personnel.

The media's paranoia about the military and their reluctance to wait out events for a complete story.

Both sides are uninformed about each other.
The media has a different view of ethics.

Sensationalism. Profit motive. Distrust. Ratings.

- 1) Misguided, self-righteousness.
- 2) Sensationalism vs. promoter.
- 3) Policeman vs. promoter.
- 4) Instant experts (i.e., few reporters have served in the Army yet they claim "inside" expertise.)
- 5) The Army does not present itself well to the media on occasion by not providing enough relevant/factual information.

I believe that much of the suspicion on both sides stems from a lack of knowledge of the technical aspects of our respective trades and respective institutional values.

The media's prioritization, which puts "a story" before national security.

Institutional motivations. Army: Good image - regardless.
Media: Sell papers; win ratings.

A. Lack of understanding. Army officers do not understand how the different media sources work and vice versa. There is a lack of training in operating with each other.

B. Waiting until a "bad news" situation to deal with one another. This contributes to the development of distrust.

Media has as its primary purposes - big bucks and headlines. Secondary purposes are valid, factual, fair, etc., news and back ground.

The media expects information that the Army is often not at liberty to provide. The media views the Army's reluctance to provide info as being arbitrary. This results in confrontational interviews and sometimes biased editing.

Knowledge, attitude, and trust.

The generals I have worked for have dictated how I must deal with the media. My last CG was an absolute "ass-hole" with his direction on how we could deal with media - i.e., we could only speak from a text that he approved; he played God!

Believe the major problem exists in the broadcast media. Competition forces the media to produce "spectacular" news and it causes skewed reporting or a failure to report a balanced story.

Media - lack of knowledge and understanding.
Army-honesty in informing; need to teach and train media about the Army.

Failure of media to address the potential threat and the resulting requirement for the military.

Media will not print truth because it is not usually sensational and does not sell papers/increase viewers. Media are negative and have preconceived ideas before they arrive at any organization or installation.

- 1) The media are more concerned with the sensational story than the truth.
- 2) The media will publish the sensational story regardless of the consequences to people.
- 3) The media are staffed primarily by left-leaning people who are bent on undermining the nation.

Failure of the Army to properly focus the media. Reagan administration does this very well.

The Army feels responsible for itself, i.e., troop-mission. The media feel responsible only to themselves and a vague belief that they have to speak to the "people."

The SOB's don't tell the truth.

The media will use or print anything, any way they want to, in order to improve sales or ratings; be it true or manufactured.

The Army is not pro-active in its approach to the media. Media counterparts must be sought out at every level and force fed information that is routine - before it becomes big news (often misrepresented) once the story breaks. This approach does not pertain to combat operations, however, where adequate unclassified information should be provided, but cameramen should not accompany troops. War, by definition, is ugly and mothers and liberals should not have to digest it with dinner.

Liberal leftist slant of the media.

The Army frequently "stonewalls," hides information, blusters, and puts forward people who present unbelievable images. Often we adopt a superior know-it-all attitude that puts off liberal,

left leaning, media types who just aren't impressed in the first place with our kind of business.

Media representatives have little military experience. Most military officers do not fully understand the role of the free press in a democratic society.

Mistrust of the media. "Business approach" of media in obtaining a story. Willingness to opt for sensationalism instead of facts at times. Ability of reporters to paint a biased picture of a news event.

The media are infused with unbridled arrogance, justified in some respects because they are unaccountable for their actions, but unjustified in that they very often do not have any background or practical experience in the areas they report about. This is worse when they editorialize under the guise of reporting. Media are big businesses, driven by the same selfish motives they impute to everyone else.

The media see their main role as the "watch-dog" for society. They fail to report all the news. Only the news they feel should be reported is aired. I cannot figure where they have this great commission. They always refer to the 1st Amendment, which certainly does not give them this authority. They are also very guilty of only reporting sensational items or trying to make common stories into exciting events. As a young captain in Vietnam, I was misquoted on two occasions and put in an awkward position by CBS and faked a firefight with the Vietnamese for NBC. As an action officer in the Army Secretariat, I watched the Washington Post attack the Reagan administration reference the military buildup with stories based on half-truths and not all the facts. With the first days in Grenada, I watched the media print stories which were inaccurate and misleading even after the facts were given to them.

The media use the Army (or any government agency) as fodder for sensationalism to sell their wares. Rarely do they place the Army in a favorable light and show the good, professional things we do. It is invariably criticism of our operations, day-to-day business, or any other aspect of the Army. You sense a great deal of mistrust by the media and almost a "Holy Quest" to make the nation's armed services look bad.

When it comes to things non-military, in general Army officers have very narrow perspectives. If the media don't report something exactly as they see it, then they believe the press is unfair or biased. Most officers do not understand the media and how they work; they don't trust media people (in some cases this is extended to Army PAOs). In this climate, only conflict can flourish.

The media's fallback stand to "right of the people to know" and "free press," vs the Army's need for secrecy (sometimes). The media's oft habit of misquoting or "selective editing." Media internal competition to get the scoop first, "whether right/wrong, complete/incomplete info," and few retractions. The Army's unfounded fear of mistakes being aired. (What should we really have to hide, except perhaps sensitive information?) Visions of Vietnam and one-sided reporting. (History/experience in general). Sensationalism in reporting.

Selective cutting or quoting. E.g. The other night on TV news an ex-Secretary of Defense was quoted as follows: "Yes, terrorism will increase in the short run...(cut)...but in the long run it will...." The network then said, "Mr X says the US action will lead to an increase in terrorism." Selective use!

In my opinion, the traditional media approach is to seek out the controversial, try to place blame, and find fault, i.e. leaning toward the sensational to some extent. In large part, this is an attitude and knowledge problem that can be directed in a more positive vein if military leaders take the time to teach media representatives. In the last couple of years it has become clear to me that one of the problems in dealing with the media is the quantity and type of information provided the public in regional media exposure. Newspapers in small central Texas towns carry local news and issues with a minimum of national news items. The general public does not have an opportunity to be exposed to more national and sometimes controversial issues because of this canalized exposure.

Those things which are news (newsworthy) are precisely those things which the Army is entrusted, expected, obligated, dedicated, and generally sworn to preclude; or, which the Army exists to do on behalf of everyone else who can't or won't. The Army is supposed to preclude: dishonesty, fraud, waste, abuse, and disasters caused by error or whatever (e.g., the Gander crash). The Army exists to do rotten things like: kill, destroy, be killed/destroyed as part of doing that to others. It is only natural for an organization entrusted with so much national wealth (both people and things) to be a target for the media. They look for and loudly announce every failure as an example of our being less than absolutely perfect trustees of that wealth, and it is only natural that there will be some failures. Despite our lack of perfection, as a profession we break our backs trying to keep the failures to a minimum, and most of us equate this effort to a moral/ethical/professional responsibility. So, trumpeting our failures amounts to (in my mind, anyway) an assault on our morals/ethics/professionalism - a very personal assault, and one which cannot fail to make the trumpeter an enemy

even if he or she is actually just a reporter doing the job as objectively as I try to do mine. And every media "attack" is an attack on each of the 780,000 in an Army uniform. If one clerk somewhere buys one \$800 toilet seat, every one of us is clearly identifiable as part of an "incompetent" organization, from the chief of staff down to the basic trainee. (An IBM clerk can buy the same toilet seat, and any IBM employee can still stop by a grocery store on the way home from work without being identifiable as a member of an "incompetent" organization.) This personalizes the Army/media conflict even more, in so far as all of us feel part of the disgust or anger generated in our communities by the reporting of our failures.

A complete difference in attitude and motivation. We are concerned with the nation's security. They are concerned with making money! A big story, regardless of its adverse affects on our national security - is seen as a way to gain personal prominence and thus command a higher salary. I do not trust newsmen either to be balanced in their reporting or to respect security matters. This is from over one year's experience in Vietnam as an information officer for the ARVN forces. The epitome of their professional attitude was voiced by a newsman who said it was up to the Army to keep its secrets and up to the newsmen to uncover and publicize them! - Absolute B S!

The media edit comments to a "different meaning" instead of using all that was said. They have total disregard for security classification. They have a thirst for sensationalism. They report only the bad side of a story and never report the opposing position when it is made known to them.

We are inherently suspicious of those who question our expertise. The media feel they represent the people. So do we, because we have charge of our country's greatest resource - its youth. Too many media and Army people do not appreciate the other's abilities or expertise. The media are in business - their competitor is show business. The media are high pressure business whether print or visual.

The attitude of media people shows they are trained to find some conflicting event or idea that will sell. Money drives this. We are morally bankrupt. We are hypocrites to one degree or another. Only a few realize this.

The media are services providing economic enterprise (or set of enterprises). As such, they must become (or remain) economically viable lest they cease to exist. To do this they must sell magazines, newspapers, or air time. The media espouse no code of ethics and show no strong moral tendencies. They, like the Army, have too many careerists and a shortage of professionals.

There is a tendency to be liberal and seek the big prize - to achieve stardom on the one hand or a Pulitzer Prize on the other. Big media are arrogant and know better what the man on the street needs to know than does the professional. That, combined with a superficial knowledge of many complex subjects, promotes faulty knowledge by the public in the best case and absolute disinformation in the worst instance. In summary, the media are too arrogant, too irresponsible, too liberal, too superficial, and represent nothing more than a service growth industry whose primary objective is to make money.

Lack of trust in each other. The Army has a terrible public affairs policy which causes the media to have to "guess" on items appearing in print or on radio, which causes the Army to mistrust the media even more.

Professionals (Army) dealing with business people (media) having different values. No ethical code adopted/abided by the media, causes "breakdowns" and unethical practices. Misquotes or shortcuts taken by the press. Senior leaders in the military "playing games" (cat and mouse) with the media. Not being candid from the start and being caught in half truths by the media.

The media tend toward advocacy journalism and ignorance of the military services. The Army get the backlash from the overtly "political" stance taken by DOD on so many issues. Also overcentralization and concern by Department of the Army which limits the ability and willingness of local PAO's to be candid.

Distrust! Dishonesty! Ambiguous reporting by the media. Sensationalism in media reporting. Media uses Constitutional Amendments as a shield to report anything and everything with no regard to conscience, national security, patriotic duty, national goodwill, etc. There is a desire by all reporters to excel in their profession - making it in the limelight is important, therefore, they will go to any extreme to acquire and sell (report) a story, with no regard for the consequences. Too many military leaders make statements to the press without accurate facts.

Knowledge, honesty of the media, media willingness to tell the whole story, and media tendency to make mountains out of molehills.

Lack of trust and fear of being misquoted.

THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE BY US ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS IN RESPONSE TO A SURVEY DISTRIBUTED IN APRIL OF 1986. 105 US ARMY STUDENTS RESPONDED.

THE QUESTION ASKED WAS: "PLEASE MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON HOW TO REDUCE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MEDIA?"

We should educate the media as to our activities and the need to sometimes control information. We must educate the American people. They have forgotten World War II and the need to control information. Need to educate ourselves on how best to deal with the press.

Be honest in answering questions or flat say, "no comment" and stick to it. Prosecute to the maximum extent of the law any misuse or disregard of classification laws.

Establish more contact between soldiers/commanders in the field and the media. Get the PAO folks out of the business. My own experience is that PAO's screw up more than they assist.

Never deal with a free lance journalist. When confronted with press people, don't try to "snow" them. Explain, don't hide issues.

Educate media and media management. Quit flinching so quickly. Do the best job we can every day.

Have the media become more positive in their reporting. A little genuine patriotism wouldn't hurt either!

Continue to educate our officers in the values and goals of the US Army. Don't try to cover up our mistakes. Talk with our adversaries.

Have media take initiatives to separate objective reporting from subjective reporting; editorialize in the editorials. Establish and enforce a trade standard of ethics; lousy reporting should not be tolerated. Teach the media by inviting attendance to more than just "showpiece" exercises.

Bring more media people to witness daily Army operations. More exposure by both parties will moderate both extreme positions.

The Army Public Affairs Department must do a better job of providing clear information and in controlling, not censoring, the news. We should open up and provide the facts, not button up and deny access.

Conduct better Army education at professional schools. Take the offensive - feed stories to media first which tell the Army side.

Require media to provide the counterpoint to a sensational or controversial story. Stop stating "conclusive" reasons for actions without facts.

Report both sides of an issue with less bias.

Revert back to the policy established prior to and during World War II. Quit pampering them with free videos/tours/etc.. Tell them to shove it up their tail if they don't like it.

Limit their ability to gain information from unofficial sources. Establish certain restraints on what a "free press" vs a "biased press" can have access to.

Get the media to report more of the true life aspect of the military. In general - reorient the media to reporting a greater percentage of positive stories as compared to the present "muck-raking" trends.

More training and exposure.

Have media personnel perform an "internship" with the Army. This could serve both our needs - train young college graduates for the media. Provide personnel for the Army PAO staffs and teach and make them more knowledgeable about the Army.

Send the media through selective courses and have military officers serve internships in news rooms.

Educate officers - beginning at the advanced course level on the role of the media in America and how to deal with them.

Formulate trust at the grass roots level. Allow freedom of expression, without being "Monday morning quarterbacks" when things go wrong. Establish credibility early. Allow editing.

Educate officers, beginning in Officer Basic Courses through Senior Service Schools, on media relations. Re-examine "no comment" guidelines. Provide as much information as early as possible to preclude "conjecture" on the part of the media. Provide news releases proactively instead of reactively.

Increase the level of knowledge on both sides.

Congress should pass an extremely rigid National Secrets Act, applicable to everyone including themselves, which would carry measures severe enough to restrain the media where self-restraint doesn't suffice.

More dialogue and cross fertilization.

Provide Army officers with training in dealing with the media.
Promote Army/media relationships. Insure the first meetings are good news or informational rather than "bad news."

Keep a news black-out until the National Command Authority determines it is all right to allow a few selected (pool) reporters into the area.

The media should seek answers to political questions from politicians.

Hold frequent seminars and stress integrity.

Let officers deal with the media based upon their rank, experience, and position. If I am qualified to command, then I am big enough to speak to the media on my own.

Develop more trust.

Continue inviting media - not once, but on a continuing or periodic basis. Go the extra mile and make them see the truth. Challenge them to print the truth; not sensationalize.

Conduct formal instruction and hold joint seminars at all service schools.

Keep well trained and educated officers as PAO. I'm personally concerned about our civilianization of many PAO positions. This will be a problem in the future because it further separates the officer and the military from the reporter.

Conduct more training and education.

Improve the media's level of responsibility.

Educate the media as to the real Army - not the bureaucracy of staffs and senior officers only, but to the day-to-day work, fun, and hardship of soldiers and their families. The Army is too often perceived as a huge entity, not as separate units, posts, and people. We sometimes view the media the same way. I once took the most hostile, female reporter with the battalion to Reforger in Europe. Once she learned what soldiers and their families were all about, her attitude changed - not her objectivity but her biases.

My discussions with people from the Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, and a congressman, make me believe the problem is at the very top of Department of the Army. Probably, we can do very

little more than train those likely to have contact with the media on how to be honest and act and appear rational. We probably can't deal with the biggest problem.

More contact at all levels.

Initiate formal training programs at advanced courses, repeat them at C&GSC and the Senior Service College level. Military PAO'S could do a better job of cultivating and/or developing a mutual trust and confidence in the reporters they work with. The military is often guilty of not telling the "whole story" right the first time, and consequently, when all the facts finally come out, the military's image is somewhat tarnished.

Education, but it is the nature of the beast which will not change. The Army must educate its leaders at all levels to be friendly to the media but more importantly to be cautious. The media will always have those few bad eggs who are looking to make a name for themselves. Investigative reporting is very dangerous but extremely popular with the media.

We need more understanding of the nation's strategy and the purpose of a military force. Report the facts. Likewise, the military should be open and honest and encourage accurate, fair reporting.

We have to bring media people and Army officers together for extended periods to really learn how each side thinks, acts, and judges. This will require a heavy investment and will not be cheap.

Let the Army "open up" to the media. Invite the media to see the good and the bad - establish Army credibility! Have installation and command media seminars at least quarterly. Take lessons from the Navy. The Army has to make peace with the media--not the reverse.

We need a real effort to show or give the true picture. Only when the security of the nation's efforts need to be protected should there be censorship.

The Army should be honest with the media and seek the media out to sell their story. Encourage the media to be more positive in reporting. Treat the media with respect and fairness. There are a lot of good things happening in the service - seek the media out to sell them on the value of reporting the positive.

I sincerely doubt it can be significantly reduced. Our goals are too different. We (Army) need the public trust and confidence, just as much as the public needs to be able to give it to us.

Our goal is to achieve/maintain it by deserving/earning it. But the medias goal is to report our failures to that same public -and it's a legimate goal; I don't question that. I just don't see any way to reduce that conflict. The best military/media relations in the world won't keep us from the occasional failure, won't preclude the ugliness (i.e. newsworthiness) of killing and destroying, and won't (and shouldn't) stop the media from reporting it.

Go back to complete regulation in a combat zone as we did in World War II - IT WORKED! The stories got to the public and the nation's security interests were safeguarded. Censorship appears to be the most dreadful thing that can happen - it is not! Not nearly as dreadful as writing letters back home to families when our soldiers are needlessly exposed by "great stories."

Make it a "give and take" operation instead of the Army always "giving" and the media always "taking."

We probably have the best we can hope for right now. Continue to strive for improved knowledge on the part of the media and fewer dumb comments and decisions on our part.

Train Army officers on how to handle the media. Those who do it best should be our models. We need to practice it and spend time with the media.

The Army should take the lead in opening a dialogue with the media that is as honest as possible, within classification limits. The Army should actively try to sell its program and policies to the media - not "stonewall" or obfuscate or avoid the subject.

Invite the press to visit units - on your own "turf," under your own conditions. Lay down rules for the media concerning security of military operations. Develop trust through open, candid communications.

We need the press more than they need us! We need to be open, even when it hurts. However, we should not hesitate to openly exercise censorship (after establishing ground rules) for active military operations. The press will tell the Army story, and only our cooperation will insure that it is accurate (or not so accurate).

Blackout the press or blacktop their actions. If this fails, "exterminate them" or allow them to live in Libia, be permant tourists in Eastern Europe, be a taxi cab driver in Athens, or a camel driver for the OPEC oilmen.

Give more education on the Army side and the media side. Try to encourage the media to write about good things.

INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH MR DREW MIDDLETON OF THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON MARCH 24, 1986 BY LTC GERALD W. SHARPE, ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STUDENT.

Sharpe: Would you give me some ideas as to what caused so much conflict between the U S Army and the press in Vietnam?

Middleton: Most of the general officers that I know now, were colonel rank or lower in Vietnam. I went out there three times. There were a lot of people only too quick to blame the media for selling them out, for writing the bad news, not for giving away secrets, there wasn't a lot of secrets given away, but for writing the bad news, you are against us, that sort of thing. As I said, most of those guys are now generals and it has held over. Now, another reason may be the Army's own making. There were too many people accredited. Every time I got out there, I thought the situation was worse. Too many people were accredited to the Army who knew nothing about war, who got their backs up at the slightest bit of guidance, not discipline, but guidance by the Army. They came from a generation too old for Korea and certainly too old for World War Two. The main reason, I think, was not that the Army handled those people that badly, that wasn't it, it was the Army's own feeling that these people were against them. Now that carries on. When I took up my job as military correspondent in 1970, I made some trips to places like Fort Hood, Fort Carson, and Fort Ord. At each place I found the men alright, but the officers were always a little suspicious. There would always be one who said "you guys sold us out" things like that. I also found that they were making their judgements on how the press would handle integration even before we started to handle it. Like "you are not going to give us a break on this."

Sharpe: You mentioned that in Vietnam you saw a lot of young reporters who had no experience. Would you, as a press person, have found it acceptable to have the military say: "Here are the qualifications you must have to come into country?"

Middleton: I certainly would. I'd be attacked of course by the liberals if I did, but I certainly would. I think that is the way to get a better coverage for both the Army and for the people.

Sharpe: That's an interesting concept, could you elaborate?

Middleton: Colonel, as you know, if we got into anything bigger, I'm not talking about a major war with Russia, if we got into something with the Mid East, we'd have to think of some kind of censorship.

Sharpe: That is one of the things we have been blamed for often. We made zero attempt, for the first time in our history, to exercise any control over what went out.

Middleton: That's right.

Sharpe: Of course, now the other side of that would say that there was no way to do it because of technology.

Middleton: The third side, if there is a third side, would say censorship at the source was practiced, as it was.

Sharpe: Yes Sir. In terms of how you were received and treated in Vietnam, as compared to what you saw in the Second World War or in Korea, both of which you covered, what did you see as the fundamental difference in the approach or attitude of the senior leadership?

Middleton: Well, the senior leadership, certainly in Korea, regretted no censorship, but MacArthur was so tough on his senior commanders, giving things away. He was the fount of all information and he was so closed-mouth about it. That was one thing, in Vietnam, it was very much a case of who I had known before. If they knew you, if they could rely on you, they would tell you anything, within reason. Both Abrams and Westmoreland were good that way. When you got down to battalion and brigade level, they were somewhat more apprehensive.

Sharpe: So, you didn't see much of a difference at the senior leadership level in the way you were approached and the way the press was approached by senior leaders.

Middleton: No, not at the senior level. No, I didn't, except I never worked in the Pacific in World War Two, so I don't know how it was there. I gather there was a lot less contact between senior Naval and Army officers there than there was in Europe. If you wanted a story, you could go out to Versailles and see the G2 and the G3, because everything you wrote was going through the censor anyway. But that was an advantage to us. We learned a lot more, and even if we could not use the stuff, you had a better knowledge of the battle.

Sharpe: Did the senior leadership in the Second World War and Korea seem to have a more positive feeling about what they were doing and the prospects for a successful outcome? In other words, some say there was a great doubt on the part of some people that we were going to succeed. Did you perceive that people were very defensive, and anytime you criticized the outcome as perhaps not being positive, everybody got very upset, while in Korea and the Second World War there was an absolute belief that the outcome was going to be positive?

Middleton: Absolutely right, and I don't think that anybody ever thought that there would be any reduction in the home front support for what was being done.

Sharpe: In all your time in reporting, did you ever feel any pressure to write any kind of story, either positive or negative?

Middleton: From whom?

Sharpe: From your employer.

Middleton: No. No, the only thing I remember was when we first got into the middle of the North African Campaign in the winter, I got back to Algeria and I got a message from Jimmy James, who was then the managing editor, saying "I wish, if you could find the time, you would go over to Morocco and look at the political-military situation there." Well, that's not an order. If I'd wired back and said, "no, there's no way," he would have found somebody else to go. But no, you didn't, and plus, as the war went on, you knew pretty well, and they told you where you should be and what was going to happen. When the Germans nearly broke through at Moritain in August of 1944, Bradley called us all in, about 12 correspondents covering 1st Army, and said "this is what they are going to do and this is what they are going to use." He told us the whole battle and of course he was using ULTRA. But we went away and were much better equipped to cover the action the next day than we would have been if we hadn't had that briefing.

Sharpe: In the coverage of the Vietnam war, did you sense there were directions higher than the generals? When you were talking one-on-one with Abrams or with Westmoreland, did you perceive there were any political problems that they were having to deal with that transcended military types of problems?

Middleton: There was a reflected apprehension about politics at home. They wouldn't say this Senator or that is giving us hell about this, or look what happened at that university, or look at the bums out in San Francisco, but they were always conscious of the fact that any professor in Boo Hoo University that got up and gave a speech would be picked up by the other side and be put all over the Far East, as well as the United States. They knew how well the other guys played the propaganda game, as indeed they did.

Sharpe: Did you spend a lot of time working with the press pool and the people over there, or did you generally go over, do your job, and then come back?

Middleton: Well, I spent five and one half weeks the first time, six weeks the second, and four weeks the third. I arranged it as carefully as I could before I went. I'd pick out certain people and tell them this is what I want to do. The last time I was there, we were booming for Vietnamization and I got a lot of good cooperation, even with those guys who said it's not working. They cooperated. The first two times were really shootem-up stuff.

Sharpe: How did you see the other press people reacting to either what they did or did not get through press briefings? Were they upset at the Army and did they express their dissatisfaction that we were being too close-hold? Were we creating the controversy as a military institution?

Middleton: Well, the press likes to picture itself in Vietnam, certainly television and radio do also, as sort of a wholesale energetic group who are always after the story, always being frustrated by the mean old Army or the mean old Air Force. Well, that's all baloney! There is just as many lazy guys in the newspaper business and in the media as anywhere else. A lot of guys liked it. They sat on their butts, they went to the five o'clock follies, they'd bitch about it because they said they didn't get any news, but they would write their stories and then go off and have a good dinner and show up again the next afternoon. The number of people who went out on combat missions was, I thought, rather small, compared to the Second World War. Very small, and I remember being with the 9th Division and they were going out on a patrol and the major said "You don't want to come along, do you?" I said "Sure, I certainly do." He said "You do? Are you nuts?" I said "No." He said "We always ask for volunteers and you are only the third guy who has volunteered since we have been out here." It wasn't anything, you know. I got him sore because I said "Well, if you want a rough patrol, patrol against the Germans."

Sharpe: Did you sense that at the lower levels, that the news from back home had an effect upon the way they treated you more than it had on the generals? Did the generals seem to understand while the junior officer did not get the big picture of the media? Did you get more hostility from the lower ranking officers?

Middleton: Yes, the lower ranking officers were the ones that got their mail clippings from home which would necessarily be out of a home town paper. I wasn't there when the Kent State Massacre happened, but several of the guys that were, told me that had a tremendous impact. And, of course, this was the same

generation that was raising hell on the campuses, a lot of them. The other thing that I got an awful lot of bitching about to me, and they would seek me out, was how come the college guys didn't have to come out here? This wasn't just true of the black soldiers, it was true of the white soldiers as well.

Sharpe: In other words, the discrimination in the draft boards was by local people who saw to it that their sons and daughters didn't come out, but that people who had no clout most certainly had to go?

Middleton: I feel I want to get down deeper into this press thing. We were blamed, and justly so, for a lot of things we did wrong. On the other hand, I thought the Army's experience in World War Two, even without censorship, wasn't used as it might have been. Example: When they were planning something big, I don't think they should have sprung it on us. They should have taken five or six correspondents, a pool, and said "now look, here is what is going to happen, and when it happens we will take you to the six or seven spots, but don't say anything." Then they would have gotten much better coverage.

Sharpe: Do you perceive that there is any institutional reason why there should be controversy between the press and military? Are the purposes of the institutions so dissimilar that institutionally there has to be controversy or there has to be conflict?

Middleton: No, I don't think there has to be. I think ignorance contributes to it as it does to everything else. Certainly in the present situation I go over every time there is an exercise in Germany like Reforger. It's a good thing that the Army brings these kids over who have never done anything but cover a fort for their local newspaper. If they have never seen an Army in the field, that's good, but those kids should go back there year after year. That is what I tell them. The Army does try to do that. I think there are some thoughtful officers in the Pentagon who realise that their way out is to try to create a group of correspondents, television and radio people, you name it, who are familiar with the armed services. Now, they can't guarantee that because a kid will get picked up and sent somewhere else.

Sharpe: Do you believe we do enough of that or not enough of that?

Middleton: I think you do enough within your resources, but I'd like to see it also done on a larger scale for the Ready Reserve and National Guard. That is less attractive to the young reporter. You know, the big divisions are what attract them.

Sharpe: What do you feel the responsibilities are of the media to conduct some type of training program for people who are going to report on the military? In other words, does the Times have a program so that when they are going to assign someone to the military beat, they send them to an Army school or an Air Force school or send them out on a six-week orientation tour at the Times' expense? Should they go out and visit the air bases, the Marines, the Navy, and the Army and really get themselves acquainted?

Middelton: They should, but they don't. The Times is a pretty well organized organization, but not that well organized. When I took over the military correspondents job in 1970, I'd been covering NATO, other wars, and things like the Middle East and Vietnam. I had some experience, but since then, no, there hasn't been any, and of course we're running out of people who have had the experience.

Sharpe: How do you think we'll do this in the future? How will the Times be able to carry on this kind of tradition with people like yourself without some type of a training program?

Middleton: They'll have to. I've argued this with the publisher. They'll have to do something. His argument always is, or was, as far as the military correspondent is concerned, the best thing we can do is get a retired officer. That's both the best thing and the worst thing, because a retired officer, no matter how clean he is, is always under suspicion, certainly in this town. So we've got to do our share of training. I think the point's well taken.

Sharpe: In looking at our relationship, and it's not just true in this paper, I wonder why the press as an institution doesn't use a similar system to government and the military? We have trained public affairs officers to deal with you, but I know of nothing in the media that trains your people to deal with us. How important would this training be?

Middleton: I think it is important, but it's got one great handicap. You might say this person is going to be the one to cover the Pentagon. Let him get out and get around the country on an orientation course, and then somebody gets sick, or somebody goes away and he is shipped off for two or three weeks. That's the problem and I think it would be a problem in any business. You can't be sure that a guy will be assigned to it for life.

Sharpe: Another area of interest is the way we've created our public affairs people. In your dealings over the years, have you found the public affairs officers to be a help or a hinderance?

Middelton: Well, I think they are a help. I think they have improved a hell of a lot since World War II. They are much more professional now than they were then. There were very few regular officers and most of the other guys couldn't hack it. There were a lot of guys who'd been in the media at home and had gotten commissions who generally knew what the media wanted, but did not know how to get it out of the military and that created difficulty. There was also, as I said before, a great many personal relationships between correspondents I knew for years before the war. If you want to get on the horn to him you could. That would be impossible now. But I think since then there is a much more highly professional group of a public affairs officers. Literally, in lot of places they have to spend their time running down stories about drunken soldiers and stuff like that, but that is all part of the game.

Sharpe: A lot of people have said that in Vietnam the public affairs officers were used more as blockades rather than a help. Did you have much opportunity to deal with the public affairs people or did your stature get you around them and in to see the people?

Middleton: No, I wouldn't say that. I chiefly used them to arrange trips and I didn't find them blocking me. If there was a colonel or a general saying, "No, I don't want that guy out here," they'd tell me. Almost always they'd say voluntarily, "Well, there is an alternative to that, there is going to be an action here." I thought that they did well in correcting, as far as they could, some of those early misimpressions in the first place. It was a good job.

Sharpe: From your forty years of experience, what advice might you give to the military side of the house on what we should do over the next ten or fifteen years to try to rebuild our relationship?

Middleton: Well, it's difficult to work closer with the media in the sense of sending people around to talk. I know they do it in the Army, at least the Army does it here. They go around to CBS, NBC, the Times and tell them what's coming up, that sort of thing. That is much more important than the hand-out; that is, personal visits.

Sharpe: How much value do you think there is to the approach of going directly to the public? There has been some advocacy that the military services should be much more aggressive in having their officers and their soldiers out speaking to groups and visiting high schools, above and beyond the recruiting forces.

Middleton: Well, I'd be all for that. Sure, because you consider the size of the military, you get precious little in these papers. You get some here and in the Washington Post, but you get damn little if you go out in the country, unless there is some incident, then you get some.

Sharpe: Do you believe that the Times will have a replacment for you in the near future?

Middleton: Well, they have been looking for years. The problem is that in my job, you've got to find somebody that not only knows the military, but has foreign experience. And that is hard to find. I was lucky, I grew up with NATO and we haven't got anybody that has done that. The one kid we had an eye on did not want it. He wanted to live in New York, that is very easy to understand. Then we had another kid in line for it but he got a chance to go to Moscow. I don't blame him, it's a great chance. I had two years there and at least you learn what not to believe. And so he is going to Moscow.

Sharpe: Is there anything that the younger officers perhaps should do in dealing with the press that would correct some of the things that you saw in Vietnam? Is there something that we should do as an institution to help our younger officers?

Middleton: Well, I think that for our younger officers it would be helpful if they just understood how the guys worked.

Sharpe: You might be suprised to know that we don't spend one hour training officers in public relations or dealing with the media during their basic or advanced courses.

Middleton: Well, the thing I think the young officer has to know or should know, is how the media works. I've come across it, as a matter of fact we have all come across it. They don't understand the essentials of time, even on a minor thing. Well, the other guy say's "well, hell, you don't have to have the story tonight. Do you?" Yes, I have to have it tonight, it's a competitive business.

Sharpe: Does the current situation in Nicaragua bear any resemblance to the early days of Vietnam?

Middleton: Not at all. In fact, I just wrote a column saying there were two things I think are going to plague American diplomacy for the next ten years. The "Vietnam Syndrome" and the no moderate Arab friend in the Mid East. I was out in Jordan last month. That is one hell of a fine army, it's not very big, but congress is holding up 1.9 billion dollars worth of equipment they badly need.

Sharpe: It would seem they would be very good at holding off the Syrian's who are big agitators over there, but we can't seem to get that point across.

Middleton: I know, I know, and it's not just the Jewish lobby, even though they have a lot to do with it. To go back to the instruction of junior officers for a minute. The Marines do something. They bring a group around here every year. They are senior NCO'S and junior officers. I don't think there is anybody higher than major.

Sharpe: At the Army War College, as an example, we have one day committed to the press and the media.

Middleton: Does someone come in from our side?

Sharpe: We have a panel. They invite people from all over the industry. One of the points I made this morning when we visited with your publisher was that the New York Times was conspicuous by its absence. He said you never received an invitation. I said that I thought the invitation had gone to your Washington office but that I would check when I got back. I certainly will find out why.

Middleton: You know the reporter learns as much out of that as I hope you do.

Sharpe: We put them down for half a day with the officers in their seminar and discuss this relationship for about four hours. I think it does a great deal for both to hear the frank views.

Middleton: The Academy does that in a very desultory way. I go up there maybe once every six or seven months. I have a meeting, I never know what group I'm meeting with, but it is a meeting.

Sharpe: Is it with students?

Middleton: Students and a couple of the faculty people. Usually the first classmen who are about to go out, and what I always do is what I told you before, explain what the business is about, how it works and a lot of them don't get it. Hell, it's changed so much anyway.

Sharpe: Do you think that the technology today, as regards the way the media works, is going to require the military to change some of its concepts? We had tight control, both from the media's point of view and the Army's, of the airways and of the communication means in World War Two and even in Korea. Today we have no control over the airways. There is a satellite terminal that can be put in Beirut that has live coverage coming in to the front room that no one can control.

Middleton: I covered the Falklands business, I didn't get down there, but I had a wonderful time in London. I also went down to Israel and Israel said they wouldn't send the NBC stuff out. NBC hired a car and took it up to Damascus. They wanted it to get out and they got it out. That's the sort of thing you'll be up against. That's why I say that future censorship in a major war is probably going to be your biggest problem.

Sharpe: It's clearly the industry that wants that news. Do you think there would be any possibility of a cooperative effort on the part of the major newspapers, the news services, and the television news to try to orchestrate some kind of an agreement on how censorship would work? Do you see an absolute opposition to that on the part of the industry or do you think they would be cooperative in it?

Middleton: Colonel, you would have to start now and get them talking about it and I think explain to them just what the problems would be. Let me think of one of the worst cases I hear all the time down in Washington. Say, the the Russians walked into Iran or something like that. It is a long ways away. We have got to get stuff out there. You got a lot of allied countries and you have no control over them.

Sharpe: I know in our seminar discussions that several of the news media people said that they would accept no censorship. That they might have accepted it in World War Two, but that they were perfectly mature adult people who could make their own decisions about what was and wasn't good for the American people to know.

Middleton: That's BS!

Sharpe: Yes sir, if that were a policy of even just one of the institutions, you have a problem. Some of the other people turned and said, "Now look, gentlemen, you have just heard what our problem is, at say ABC news." If this organization says "your censorship be damned, it's coming straight back on the airwave and is going on television in my area." Don't think for a minute that I can say "OK Army, I'm going to be the good guy and I'm going to abide by the censorship."

Middleton: Absolutely, and if they've got an exclusive, they want to be on the air with it. It may mean a couple million dollars worth of advertising. I wouldn't believe anybody that said that, not even the New York Times. We, in the past, not in World War Two, withheld certain things, but always on the request of the President.

(The interview was ended when a secretary came to the office and said Libya had just shot down three US airplanes)

QUESTIONNAIRE-ARMY/MEDIA RELATIONS

1. This questionnaire is designed to gain information about U.S. Army/media relations. My study project at the U.S. Army War College is combined with a Masters Degree research project to determine information about the positive and negative aspects of the relationship between senior Army officers and media persons with military related duties.

2. The survey is divided into four parts and will take about 15 minutes to answer. Part one asks about views and attitudes. Part two seeks information on the quality of the relationship. Part three seeks demographic data. Part four is optional and allows you to make written comments if you desire. For Army students, please use your last job or supervisor where appropriate.

3. The word "counterpart(s)" in this survey, when referring to people, means Army officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above. It refers to any media employee involved with some aspect of reporting, writing, or editing news about the U.S. Army. When referring to an organization it means the U.S. Army or the national, state, and local print and electronic media.

4. All individual responses will be confidential. No individual will be identified in the study. The study results will be provided to the Army and media to help reinforce the positive aspects of the relationship. Your honest assistance in this project may well have an effect on future Army/media relations.

5. All respondents will be sent a copy of the final study if requested. To receive a copy, place your mailing address on the final sheet. Study results should be mailed in early June.

PART 1

The following questions seek to determine your views and attitudes on Army/media relations. Choose the answer closest to your view. Using a pen or a pencil, place a X in the most appropriate box.

1. In general, current relations between the Army/media are best described as

- ☐ poor
- ☐ fair
- ☐ good
- ☐ excellent

2. Your relationship with your counterparts in the Army/media are best described as

- ☐ poor
- ☐ fair
- ☐ good
- ☐ excellent

3. Your trust level in your counterparts in the Army/media can best be described as

- ☐ low
- ☐ moderate
- ☐ high

4. How have your views changed over the years about your counterparts in the Army/media?

- ☐ good to poor
- ☐ poor and stayed poor
- ☐ good and stayed good
- ☐ poor to good

5. How would you describe the effects of the U.S. Army as a factor in American society today?

- ☐ negative
- ☐ neutral
- ☐ positive

6. How would you describe the trust level of the nation in the media?

- ☐ low
- ☐ moderate
- ☐ high

7. How would you describe the trust level of the country in the U.S. Army?

- ☐ low
- ☐ moderate
- ☐ high

9. What is the longest period of time you have spent with your counterpart organization at any one time or period?

- ☐ one day or less
- ☐ one to two days
- ☐ three to four days
- ☐ five to seven days
- ☐ more than seven days

10. Which order best describes your view of the most accurate source of news (most to least)?

- ☐ print, radio, TV
- ☐ print, TV, radio
- ☐ radio, TV, print
- ☐ radio, print, TV
- ☐ TV, radio, print
- ☐ TV, print, radio

11. What authority should a combat commander have to censor news which involves military operations?

- ☐ none
- ☐ some
- ☐ based on preestablished rules only
- ☐ complete

12. Was the media correct in publishing the "Pentagon Papers?"

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no
- ☐ I don't know

13. Was the military correct in banning the media from Granada during the first 24 hours of the operation?

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no
- ☐ I don't know

14. What about the second 24 hours?

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no
- ☐ I don't know

15. In which order were the following most responsible for our loss in Viet Nam (most to least)?

- ☐ government, military, media
- ☐ government, media, military
- ☐ media, government, military
- ☐ media, military, government
- ☐ military, government, media
- ☐ military, media, government

16. Which network is the most favorable to the Army?

- ☐ ABC
- ☐ CBS
- ☐ NBC

17. Which network is the least favorable to the Army?

- ☐ ABC
- ☐ CBS
- ☐ NBC

18. Which news magazine is most favorable to the Army?

- ☐ Newsweek
- ☐ Time
- ☐ U S News and World Report

19. Which news magazine is least favorable to the Army?

- ☐ Newsweek
- ☐ Time
- ☐ U S News and World Report

PART 2

The following questions seek to determine what causes conflict between the Army and the media.

20. Which of the following areas is the greatest cause of conflict between you and your counterparts in the Army/media?

- ☐ organization
- ☐ attitude
- ☐ knowledge
- ☐ training

21. What is the second greatest cause of conflict?

- ☐ organization
- ☐ attitude
- ☐ knowledge
- ☐ training

22. Which of the following has created the most problems for you in your relations with your counterparts?

- ☐ timeliness
- ☐ honesty
- ☐ attitude
- ☐ knowledge

23. Which is the second greatest problem?

- ☐ timeliness
- ☐ honesty
- ☐ attitude
- ☐ knowledge

24. What effect would spending more time with your counterpart organization have on potential conflict reduction?

- ☐ none
- ☐ little
- ☐ some
- ☐ great

25. What is your supervisors attitude toward your counterpart organization?

- ☐ very negative
- ☐ negative
- ☐ neutral
- ☐ positive
- ☐ very positive

26. What do you believe is your organizations view of your counterpart?

- ☐ very negative
- ☐ negative
- ☐ neutral
- ☐ positive
- ☐ very positive

27. How many times have you been misquoted (Army) or accused of misquoting (media) by your counterparts?

- ☐ never
- ☐ once
- ☐ twice
- ☐ three to four times
- ☐ five or more times

28. How much current knowledge about your organization do you believe your counterparts hold?

- ☐ none
- ☐ little
- ☐ some
- ☐ great

29. What effect does the amount of time you must spend dealing with your counterparts have on your relationship?

- ☐ very negative
- ☐ negative
- ☐ none
- ☐ positive
- ☐ very positive

30. How much formal training did your employer provide about your counterpart organization?

- ☐ none
- ☐ less than one day
- ☐ one to three days
- ☐ four to seven days
- ☐ more than seven days

31. What is your view of your counterpart organization?

- ☐ very negative
- ☐ negative
- ☐ neutral
- ☐ positive
- ☐ very positive

PART 3

The following questions are designed to allow your answers to be arranged by experience, area of employment, sex, etc.

32. Answer this question only if you are an Army officer. What is your source of commission?

- ☐ ROTC
- ☐ West Point
- ☐ OCS
- ☐ Direct
- ☐ other _____
(please write in source)

33. Answer this question only if you are an Army officer. Which best describes your current (or last) duty assignment?

- ☐ commander
- ☐ staff officer
- ☐ public information officer
- ☐ other _____
(please write in title)

34. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your media?

- ☐ national TV
- ☐ national radio
- ☐ national print
- ☐ state/local TV
- ☐ state/local radio
- ☐ state/local print

35. Answer this question only if you are a member of the media. Which best describes your duty assignment?

- ☐ reporter
- ☐ commentator
- ☐ writer
- ☐ editor
- ☐ administrator
- ☐ other

(please write in title)

36. How many years experience do you have in your profession?

- ☐ 0-5
- ☐ 6-10
- ☐ 11-15
- ☐ 16-20
- ☐ 21-25
- ☐ 26 or more

37. Which of the following best describes your level of formal education?

- ☐ high school graduate
- ☐ college/university, two years or less
- ☐ college/university, more than two years
- ☐ college/university graduate
- ☐ advanced degree

38. Which of the following best describes the number of hours per week you are involved with your counterparts?

- ☐ none
- ☐ 1/2
- ☐ 3/4
- ☐ 5/10
- ☐ 11/15
- ☐ 16/20
- ☐ more than 20

39. Your age is?

- ☐ less than 21
- ☐ 21-29
- ☐ 30-39
- ☐ 40-49
- ☐ 50-59
- ☐ 60 or greater

40. Your sex is?

- ☐ female
- ☐ male

41. Which best describes your political leanings?

- ☐ Democratic
- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Independent

PART 4 (OPTIONAL)

42. Please indicate your view on the chief cause(s) of conflict between the Army and the media?

43. Please make any recommendations you might have on how to reduce conflict between the Army and the media?

Please include your mailing address below if you desire a copy of the final study.

END

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